Ariel M. Childress v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 84A01-1612-CR-2938

Childress pled guilty (Oct 2013) to three counts of Class B felony arson and received concurrent aggregate sentences: 14 years total (6 years executed on work release; 8 years suspended to probation).
After work-release violations, Childress served the 6-year executed portion, later transferred to a community transition program, and began probation on April 8, 2016.
State alleged new probation violations: criminal charges for operating while intoxicated and controlled-substance driving; Childress admitted a drug-use violation and was placed in a Jail Linkage Program and then a sober living requirement at Club Soda.
Childress was unsuccessfully discharged from Club Soda for rule violations and threats; a discharge letter from Club Soda and positive drug-screen results were submitted at the revocation hearing.
At the November 28, 2016 revocation hearing Childress expressly stated he had no objection to admission of the Club Soda letter and drug results, and he personally admitted he used drugs and was discharged. The court revoked probation and ordered the previously suspended 8-year sentence executed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Childress)	Held
Whether admission of hearsay at a probation-revocation hearing without on-the-record substantial-trustworthiness findings was error	Hearsay permissible in revocations under flexible due-process standards; evidence was admitted and corroborated by defendant's admissions	Admission of probation officer testimony and exhibits (Club Soda letter, drug results) was hearsay and lacked the Reyes substantial-trustworthiness finding; error is fundamental because evidence was the only basis for revocation	No reversible error — defendant waived objection by saying "no objection," and any erroneous admission was harmless because Childress admitted the violations. Revocation affirmed.

Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. 2007) (probation is discretionary and revocation procedures may be more flexible than criminal trials)
Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438 (Ind. 2007) (adoption of the substantial-trustworthiness test for hearsay in probation revocation hearings)
Kelley v. United States, 446 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2006) (explains on-the-record reliability rationale quoted in Reyes)
McQueen v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to object waives challenge to evidence; fundamental-error standard described)
Figures v. State, 920 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (admission of evidence at revocation can be harmless if independent grounds support revocation)
McFall v. State, 71 N.E.3d 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (questionable evidentiary foundation may be cured by defendant's subsequent testimony)
Carden v. State, 873 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (fundamental error where hearsay was only evidence supporting revocation)
Hopkins v. State, 782 N.E.2d 988 (Ind. 2003) (prejudice required for fundamental-error review)