Arias v. Raimondo, 860 F.3d 1185

José Arnulfo Arias worked for Angelo Dairy beginning in 1995; the employers failed to complete I-9s and threatened to report him to immigration if he sought other work.
Arias sued Angelo Dairy in California state court in 2006 on wage-and-hour and related claims (including a PAGA representative claim); a trial was set for August 2011.
Ten weeks before trial, Angelo Dairy’s attorney, Anthony Raimondo, contacted ICE with Arias’s identifying information and offered assistance in apprehending him; Raimondo had a documented pattern of similar contacts.
Fearing deportation, Arias settled his state claims in July 2011 and later filed a federal suit (May 2013) alleging retaliation under the FLSA § 215(a)(3) against Raimondo (among others), plus state tort and UCL claims.
The district court dismissed Raimondo as a defendant under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding he could not be liable because he was not Arias’s employer under the FLSA employer-control tests.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that FLSA § 215(a)(3)’s anti-retaliation protection can reach persons who are not the employee’s actual employer, including an attorney acting on the employer’s behalf.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a non-employer (employer’s attorney) can be liable under FLSA § 215(a)(3) for retaliation	Raimondo may be liable because § 215(a)(3) prohibits retaliation by “any person,” and § 203(d) defines employer broadly to include persons acting "directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer"	Raimondo argues he was not Arias’s employer and employer-based tests (economic control) bar § 215(a)(3) liability	Held: § 215(a)(3) reaches “any person”; an attorney who acts to retaliate on behalf of an employer can be sued under the FLSA for retaliation
Whether FLSA employer/"economic control" tests for substantive wage-and-hour claims should limit § 215(a)(3) retaliation claims	Arias: anti-retaliation provision has different purpose and scope; importing economic-control test would thwart enforcement	Raimondo: district court applied economic-control precedent and argued non-employers cannot be liable	Held: Economic-control tests govern substantive wage/hour liability but do not limit § 215(a)(3); anti-retaliation provision is broader and may cover non-employers acting in interest of employer

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (antiretaliation provisions are broader than substantive employment provisions; protection extends beyond workplace acts)
Bowe v. Judson C. Burns, Inc., 137 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943) (Section 15(a)(3) applies to “any person,” not only employers)
Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 1999) (§ 215(a)(3) may provide jurisdiction and liability against non-employers who retaliate for wage/hour claims)
Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009) (uses economic-control test to determine employer status for substantive FLSA wage claims)
Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983) (applies economic-control analysis to determine employer for wage-and-hour liability)