Arguello, 448 F.Supp.3d 655

On December 9, 2015, a physical altercation on Martin Arguello’s property left 17‑year‑old Dylan LaFavers with two gunshot wounds; parties dispute sequence and intent.
Arguello admitted liability and stipulated to $2,036,728.22 in damages but sought bankruptcy under Chapter 7 and contested nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
The bankruptcy court found, on the objective "substantial certainty" theory, that Arguello acted willfully and maliciously and entered judgment that the debt was nondischargeable.
Arguello unsuccessfully moved for a continuance before trial; the bankruptcy court denied the late request as untimely and within its discretion.
On appeal the district court affirmed the finding that Arguello’s conduct was willful and malicious (objective substantial‑certainty prong) but vacated the nondischargeability determination and remanded for the bankruptcy court to consider whether Arguello’s actions were "sufficiently justified under the circumstances."
The district court also affirmed denial of the continuance and rejected Arguello’s argument that only his mental state at the instant of the injurious shots could be considered.

Issue	LaFavers' Argument	Arguello's Argument	Held
Whether LaFavers proved nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6)	Shots were objectively substantially certain to cause harm → debt nondischargeable	Shots were unintentional reflexive discharges while defending himself → not willful or malicious	Court: affirmed willful/malicious finding (objective prong) but vacated final nondischargeability judgment pending justification inquiry
Whether court must assess only defendant’s subjective intent at the exact moment of the injurious shots	Not necessary; objective substantial‑certainty can be used to infer intent	Only the defendant’s state of mind at the exact moment of the injurious discharges is relevant	Court: rejected Arguello’s narrow timing argument; objective substantial‑certainty may be used to infer subjective intent
Whether Arguello’s actions were “sufficiently justified under the circumstances” (affirmative defense)	N/A (LaFavers relied on the objective prong)	Asserted justification/self‑defense that could render injury non‑willful and dischargeable	Court: bankruptcy court failed to decide this; remanded for fact‑specific assessment of justification
Whether denial of Arguello’s continuance was an abuse of discretion	N/A	Denial was erroneous — counsel needed time to obtain police/grand jury materials and had conflicting state trial	Court: no abuse; denial was reasonable given discovery cutoff and late filing

Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991) (movant must prove nondischargeability by preponderance of the evidence)
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998) (§ 523(a)(6) requires intent to cause the injury in question)
Miller v. J.D. Abrams Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 1998) (§ 523(a)(6) satisfied by either objective substantial certainty of harm or subjective motive to harm)
Corley v. Delaney (In re Delaney), 97 F.3d 800 (5th Cir. 1996) (intent to cause the actual injury satisfies § 523(a)(6); substantial‑certainty theory supports inference of intent)
Williams v. IBEW Local 520 (In re Williams), 337 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 2003) (restating the Miller objective/subjective formulation)
Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 704 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1983) (historical definitions of “willful” and “malicious” for nondischargeability analysis)
Berry v. Vollbracht (In re Vollbracht), [citation="276 F. App'x 360"] (5th Cir.) (court may find an injury "sufficiently justified" so as not to be willful and malicious)