Argent Mortgage Co. v. Wachovia Bank N.A., 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 20132

Background

Olympus Mortgage on property securing $90,000 executed Aug 31, 2004 and recorded Jan 5, 2005; Olympus later assigned to Wachovia.
Argent Mortgage on the same property securing $65,000 executed Dec 10, 2004 and recorded Jan 31, 2005; Wells Fargo later owned Argent.
Wachovia filed foreclose Olympus and enforce lost loan documents; Argent joined as potential lien claimant.
Wachovia and Argent each moved for summary judgment on priority; trial court held Olympus had priority under race-notice theory and entered partial judgment for Wachovia.
Argent challenged priority ruling, arguing Florida recording statutes are not race-notice; the appellate court reversed, holding Florida remains a notice jurisdiction and Argent has priority.
Case remanded for proper determination consistent with the notice-priority rule, with the court reversing the priority ruling.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 695.01 and 695.11 create race-notice or notice priority.	Argent: 695.01 is a notice statute; 695.11 does not convert to race-notice.	Wachovia: 1967 amendment to 695.11 converts Florida to race-notice.	Florida remains a notice jurisdiction; statutes do not create race-notice priority.
Effect of the 1967 amendment to 695.11 on recording priority.	Amendment refines timing, not the 695.01 notice requirement.	Amendment alters priority framework to race-notice.	Amendment does not alter 695.01’s notice framework; priority unchanged by 695.11.
Which mortgage has priority under the notice framework given undisputed facts.	Argent, as a later-for-value mortgagee without notice, has priority over Olympus.	Wachovia contends Olympus has priority under race-notice considerations.	Argent has priority; trial court erred in granting Wachovia priority.

Key Cases Cited

Lesnoff v. Becker, 135 So. 146 (1931) (notice when later purchaser without notice protects title)
Morris v. Osteen, 946 So.2d 826 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (notice and recording interplay in priority)
F.J. Holmes Equip., Inc. v. Babcock Bldg. Supply, Inc., 553 So.2d 748 (Fla.5th DCA 1989) (recognizes notice-based priority under recording statutes)
Van Eepoel Real Estate Co. v. Sarasota Milk Co., 129 So. 892 (Fla. 1930) (early articulation of recording statute principles)
Rice v. Greene, 941 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (illustrates race-notice concepts but does not apply to 695.11 as sole determinant)
Anderson v. N. Fla. Prod. Credit Ass’n, 642 So.2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (official recording triggers priority despite indexing)
Orix Fin. Servs., Inc. v. MacLeod, 977 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) ( indexing and recording timing considerations)
Broward County v. Recupero, 949 So.2d 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (section 695.11 time of recording defined)
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 964 So.2d 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (notice/recording principles in recording statute context)
In re Forfeiture of $91,357.12, 595 So.2d 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (effective time of recording and official recording)
Paterson v. Brafman, 530 So.2d 499 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (constructive notice effects in recording)
Lamchick, Glucksman & Johnston, P.A. v. City Nat’l Bank of Fla., 659 So.2d 1118 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (priority of liens and recording)
Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. Soltesiz, 636 So.2d 63 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (priority between judgment liens and recorded instruments)
Martinez v. Reyes, 405 So.2d 468 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (priority under recording statutes)