ARGANBRIGHT v. STATE, 2014 OK CR 5

Appellant Ronald Arganbright, an Oklahoma Highway Patrol trooper, was convicted at a bench trial of: (1) Lewd or Indecent Acts to a Child under 16; and (2) Soliciting Sexual Conduct or Communication with a Minor by Use of Technology (21 O.S. Supp. 2007, §1040.18a). Sentences were concurrent five-year terms with portions suspended.
Victim M.C. was 15 when the relationship began; sexual activity occurred before and after her 16th birthday; some charged texts were sent after she turned 16.
The charged technology-count criminalized facilitating/encouraging/offering/soliciting sexual conduct with a minor or communicating sexual/prurient interest with a minor by use of any technology.
Arganbright challenged §1040.18a(A) as an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments (as applied to his texts to a 16‑year‑old who had reached the age of sexual consent).
The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the statute as a content-based restriction that survives strict scrutiny: it serves the compelling state interest of protecting minors from sexual exploitation via technology and is narrowly tailored in the Court’s view.

Issue	Appellant's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether 21 O.S. Supp. 2007 §1040.18a(A) is unconstitutional as applied to Arganbright’s sexual text messages to a 16‑year‑old	§1040.18a(A) is a content‑based restriction that is not justified as applied because the victim had reached the age of consent and the communications concerned lawful, consensual conduct	§1040.18a(A) advances a compelling state interest — protecting minors from luring, sexual exploitation, abuse, trafficking and related harms — and is narrowly tailored to prevent use of technology to facilitate such exploitation	Court upheld the statute as constitutional as applied; conviction and sentence affirmed

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (content‑based speech restrictions and strict scrutiny)
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530 (definition of content‑based regulation)
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (regulations focused on speech's direct impact on its audience are content‑based)
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (content‑neutral restriction framework)
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (content‑neutral regulation principles)
Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (content‑based restrictions presumptively invalid)
Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (regulation of indecent but protected speech; narrow tailoring requirement)
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (compelling state interest in preventing sexual exploitation of children)
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (limited regulation to protect children is permissible)
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (upholding restrictions on sale of sexual materials to minors)
Playboy Entm't Group v. United States, 529 U.S. 803 (less restrictive alternatives and narrow tailoring)
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (adult speech cannot be unduly burdened if less restrictive means exist)