Ardon v. Attorney General of the United States
449 F. App'x 116
3rd Cir.2011Background
- Ardon, a Honduran citizen, entered the U.S. in 1992 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1999.
- In 2003 Ardon was convicted of passport fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1542 for a 1997 false-name passport scheme.
- The government charged removability under § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) but withdrew it, alleging removability under § 237(a)(1)(A) due to inadmissibility at adjustment.
- The IJ found Ardon inadmissible under § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) for falsely claiming U.S. citizenship but not for § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); cancellation of removal was pursued.
- The BIA denied relief under § 240A(b) for lack of 10 years’ continuous physical presence, applying the stop-time rule.
- The BIA held that the stop-time clock stopped in May 1997 when Ardon committed passport fraud, and relief was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the BIA correctly reviewed the IJ de novo on legal issues | Ardon argues BIA errors in remand reasoning and legal findings. | BIA properly reviewed the IJ’s law de novo and considered all grounds. | BIA's legal determinations reviewed de novo; upheld. |
| Whether Ardon is ineligible for cancellation under § 240A(b) due to 10-year presence | Ardon claims stop-time does not render him inadmissible and he has 10 years' presence. | Stop-time applies because offense renders him inadmissible under 212(a)(2). | Denied; stop-time termination applies, precluding relief. |
| Whether passport fraud constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) | Ardon contends CIMT not established for passport fraud. | Passport fraud under § 1542 constitutes CIMT as per Board precedent. | Yes; § 1542 is a CIMT. |
| Whether the offense referred to in § 212(a)(2) that renders inadmissible terminates continuous residence | Ardon asserts he was not inadmissible and thus stop-time not triggered. | Criminal conduct can terminate continuous presence even if not charged as inadmissible on that ground. | Stops the clock; continuous presence terminated. |
| Whether the government’s withdrawal of the § 237(a)(2) ground affects the stop-time rule analysis | Ardon argues without the charged ground, stop-time may not apply. | Stop-time does not require the alien be charged on the adverse ground. | Irrelevant to stop-time rule; it applies. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Jurado-Delgado, 24 I. & N. Dec. 29 (BIA 2006) (criminal conduct can terminate continuous residence even if not charged as inadmissible on the applicable ground)
- In re Correa-Garces, 20 I. & N. Dec. 451 (BIA 1992) (crimes involving fraud are crimes involving moral turpitude)
- Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2006) (conviction under § 1542 is CIMT)
- Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2010) (review framework when BIA issues a separate opinion)
- Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347 (3d Cir. 2004) (de novo review of legal determinations by BIA)