Ardan v. Board of Review, 177 A.3d 768

Background

Margo Ardan resigned from her RN position at Lourdes Medical Center in November 2012 and began a new healthcare-communications job days later; she was terminated from the new job after seven weeks and applied for unemployment benefits.
Ardan suffered from chronic orthopedic pain predating her Lourdes employment; she did not disclose the condition to Lourdes or request accommodations before resigning.
The Department denied benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) (disqualification for voluntary quits without good cause); the relevant regulation, N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.3(b), exempts employees who leave for non-work-caused medical conditions aggravated by work if "no other suitable work" was available within the limits of the disability.
At initial hearing Ardan did not present medical evidence; on appeal she submitted medical records and argued she fit the 9.3(b) exception, but never contacted Lourdes to seek reassignment or accommodation.
The Board of Review and Appellate Division upheld the denial, construing 9.3(b) to require notice to the employer and a request for accommodation; the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether N.J.A.C. 12:17‑9.3(b) requires claimants to notify their employer of a medical condition and request an accommodation before resigning	Ardan: regulation does not impose a notice-and-request requirement; she need only prove no suitable work was available	Board/Medical Center: claimant must notify employer and request accommodation so employer can identify suitable work	Court: regulation does not generally impose a categorical notice-and-inquiry requirement; such a rule would require formal rulemaking and is "plainly unreasonable" as an agency interpretation
Whether Ardan met her burden under N.J.A.C. 12:17‑9.3(b) to show no suitable work was available	Ardan: her uncontradicted testimony and medical records established that no suitable work existed at Lourdes	Board: Ardan failed to prove unavailability because she never sought reassignment or engaged HR	Court: even without a general notice rule, Ardan failed to prove no suitable work existed—her statements were speculative and she presented no job listings, descriptions, or employer inquiry showing futility
Whether the 2015 amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21‑5(a) (protecting short‑transition hires) applies retroactively to Ardan’s 2012 claim	Ardan: amendment should be applied retroactively to benefit her	Board/Medical Center: amendment is prospective only	Court: amendment is prospective; no clear legislative intent to make it retroactive, it was not "curative," and retroactivity would not be supported by parties’ expectations
Standard of review for agency interpretation	Ardan: N/A (argues regulation ambiguous)	Board: defer to agency	Court: applies deference but will overturn agency interpretation that is "plainly unreasonable"; interprets regulation by its plain text and context

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197 (1997) (unemployment law construed liberally in favor of benefits; distinguishing voluntary quits with/without good cause)
Yardville Supply Co. v. Bd. of Review, 114 N.J. 371 (1989) (discussing remedial purpose of unemployment law and exception when employee tries to protect employment)
US Bank, N.A. v. Hough, 210 N.J. 187 (2012) (appellate courts not bound by agency interpretation of statute but defer unless interpretation is plainly unreasonable)
Metromedia, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 97 N.J. 313 (1984) (factors to determine when agency action is rulemaking rather than adjudication)
James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552 (2014) (retroactivity principles favor prospectivity; three circumstances for retroactivity)
In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31 (1996) (retroactivity analysis and when legislative intent may support retroactive application)
Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515 (1981) (legislative history can show intent to apply amendment retroactively)