302 A.3d 975
Del. Ch.2023Background
- Seller Vincent P. Mona sold his privately held electrical-construction company to Purchaser ArchKey for a $21 million headline price; the SPA included a post-closing Accountant True‑Up Mechanism tied to an Adjusted Closing Balance Sheet.
- SPA §2.6 required Purchaser to prepare the Adjusted Closing Balance Sheet “in good faith and in accordance with GAAP and consistent with the past practices of [the Company] and the November Balance Sheet,” and designated Ernst & Young as the “Independent Accountant,” stating that the Independent Accountant “shall act as an arbitrator.”
- Purchaser delivered an Adjusted Closing Balance Sheet that reduced consideration to about $8.375 million, creating a ~$12.6 million shortfall; Mona served an objection (the January Letter) asserting 45 disputes and alleging lack of good faith and GAAP violations.
- Purchaser filed suit seeking to declare Mona’s objection invalid and to compel payment; Purchaser moved to compel arbitration before the Independent Accountant.
- The Court treated the motion (after discovery) as a summary‑judgment motion on arbitrability, held that the SPA’s mechanism is an Accountant True‑Up Mechanism (an expert determination), not FAA arbitration, and stayed the litigation pending the Independent Accountant’s determinations.
- The court ruled that accounting questions (consistency with past practice, GAAP compliance, and whether entries were made in good faith) are for the Independent Accountant; claims beyond the accountant’s authority (e.g., a breach of a substantive assignment obligation or a post‑accountant implied‑covenant claim) remain for the court after the accountant’s findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (ArchKey) | Defendant's Argument (Mona) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Does §2.6’s reference to an Independent Accountant as an “arbitrator” compel FAA arbitration? | SPA calls the accountant an arbitrator; FAA should apply and court must compel arbitration. | The provision is a standard Accountant True‑Up (expert determination); calling the accountant an "arbitrator" is not dispositive. | The provision is an Accountant True‑Up Mechanism (expert determination), not FAA arbitration; word “arbitrator” is not dispositive—look to scope/authority. |
| 2) Who decides procedural/interpretive disputes (e.g., whether Mona’s January Letter was a valid Objection Notice)? | All disputes concerning the true‑up (including notice sufficiency) should go to the Independent Accountant. | Court should resolve procedural/legal questions such as sufficiency of the Objection Notice and waiver. | Court applies contract interpretation; procedural/legal gateway issues can be for the court. The accountant decides matters squarely within the true‑up (limited to disputed items in the Objection Notice). |
| 3) Do disputes about whether the Adjusted Closing Balance Sheet is consistent with past practices and GAAP go to the accountant? | Yes; the Independent Accountant should resolve accounting treatment and consistency questions. | No; the court should decide the meaning of “past practices” and whether GAAP or past practice controls. | These accounting questions are for the Independent Accountant; the court provides interpretive guidance (definition of consistency, interplay of GAAP and past practice) but leaves application to the accountant. |
| 4) Can Mona pursue an implied‑covenant / bad‑faith claim now, or must the accountant act first? | Purchaser impliedly argues the accountant should resolve first; litigation may follow. | Mona seeks an immediate judicial determination of bad faith and other contract claims. | The Independent Accountant must first determine accounting issues and may decide whether entries show lack of good faith for the true‑up; a court can address an implied‑covenant claim (including bad‑faith theory) only after the accountant’s determinations. |
Key Cases Cited
- Terrell v. Kiromic Biopharma, Inc., 297 A.3d 610 (Del. 2023) (adopts the authority‑based test to distinguish arbitration from expert determination)
- Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. LLC, 166 A.3d 912 (Del. 2017) (recognizes narrow scope of accountant true‑up where accountant acts as expert, not arbitrator)
- Penton Bus. Media Hldgs., LLC v. Informa PLC, 252 A.3d 445 (Del. Ch. 2021) (discussion of arbitration vs. expert determination spectrum and analytical factors)
- Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Winshall, 72 A.3d 78 (Del. 2013) (distinguishes substantive and procedural arbitrability and gateway questions)
- Hall Street Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (limits parties’ ability to expand judicial review of arbitral awards under the FAA)
- Baldwin v. New Wood Res. LLC, 283 A.3d 1099 (Del. 2022) (recognizes implied‑covenant claim premised on malicious or bad‑faith conduct)
- Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986) (sets forth restrictive test for implying contractual terms via implied covenant)
- Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120 (Del. 2010) (explains limits and function of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing)
