Archie v. U.S. Bank, N.A., As Trustee for the RMAC Trust, Series 2016-CTT, 18-CV-945 & 19-CV-155

Background

Nita Archie received 1467 Chapin St., N.W. from her parents and obtained multiple refinances (2005–2007), including a $436,000 adjustable-rate loan in 2007 executed with Premier; she defaulted May 1, 2008 and made no payments thereafter.
Premier sold the note to CitiMortgage immediately after origination; Citi later sold a distressed loan to PennyMac (2011); U.S. Bank is the eventual successor/assignee.
Citi issued a notice of default/intent to accelerate in August 2008; PennyMac filed a judicial foreclosure complaint on December 31, 2014.
Archie asserted numerous affirmative defenses, recoupment defenses, and counterclaims (fraud, unconscionability, CPPA, RESPA, laches, quiet title); she moved for judgment on the pleadings for lack of standing; Superior Court denied that motion, initially applied a six-year UCC limitations period but then concluded a twelve-year sealed-instrument period applied and entered summary judgment for PennyMac.
On appeal the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed denial of judgment on the pleadings and the limitations ruling (12-year period), but reversed and vacated summary judgment for PennyMac as to Archie’s standing and multiple defenses/counterclaims and remanded for further proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (PennyMac/U.S. Bank)	Defendant's Argument (Archie)	Held
1. Rule 12(c) standing to foreclose	Complaint pleadings show PennyMac as current holder/beneficiary; attached endorsement in blank suffices to plead standing	Endorsement paperwork does not show chain from Premier -> Citi -> PennyMac; lack of prior endorsement defeats standing	Denied Archie's Rule 12(c) motion; complaint plausibly alleged standing so dismissal at pleadings stage was improper
2. Applicable statute of limitations	UCC § 28:3-118(a) six-year rule for enforcing a note should bar late suit	Deed/note bear "seal" — 12-year sealed-instrument period under D.C. Code § 12‑301(6) applies; foreclosure is in rem on deed of trust	Court held 12-year limitations for sealed instruments governs foreclosure (in rem); six-year UCC note limitation does not bar this foreclosure action
3. Standing at summary judgment (chain of endorsements/allonges)	Documentary evidence and depositions show PennyMac acquired the note and may enforce deed; endorsments on allonges support standing	Multiple versions of allonges, canceled stamps, affiants lacking personal knowledge raise factual dispute whether endorsements were properly affixed/transferred	Summary judgment improper on standing: genuine factual disputes about chain of title and intent to affix allonges preclude judgment for PennyMac
4. Unconscionability, fraud, and unclean-hands defenses	Archie received substantial cash proceeds and benefitted; she signed documents and cannot rely on reading failures or delay to avoid loan	Premier induced loan by falsifying income and promising a job; Archie was unsophisticated, lacked understanding, may have been fraudulently induced; Premier’s misconduct may be worse than Archie’s	Summary judgment improperly granted for PennyMac; evidence raised triable issues on unconscionability, fraud-in-the-inducement/factum, ratification, and whether inequitable conduct bars foreclosure
5. CPPA liability/recoupment against successor/assignee	PennyMac only bought a defaulted loan and did not sell credit to Archie; not a "merchant" supplying goods/services to consumer	Successors/assigns of merchants can be CPPA respondents; transferee can be subject to recoupment for originations-based CPPA violations	Dismissal of CPPA defenses/counterclaim vacated; court left open whether PennyMac can be a CPPA merchant or subject to recoupment; remanded for factual development
6. RESPA recoupment, laches, and quiet-title	RESPA offensive claims time-barred; delay did not prejudice PennyMac; Archie cannot quiet title because PennyMac’s title is superior	Recoupment preserves defenses despite RESPA's one-year offensive limitation; equitable laches may bar relief due to prejudice from delay; quiet title depends on success of other claims	RESPA recoupment cannot be summarily dismissed as time-barred; laches is an unaddressed triable defense; quiet-title claim vacated for now and tied to outcome of other defenses — remand ordered

Key Cases Cited

Murray v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 953 A.2d 308 (D.C. 2008) (word "seal" adjacent to signature creates sealed instrument subject to 12-year limitations)
Brice v. Walker, 121 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (deed of trust is a sealed instrument and governed by longer limitations period)
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co. N.A. v. Henderson, 862 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holder of a note may enforce a deed of trust by judicial foreclosure)
Szego v. Anyanwutaku, 651 A.2d 315 (D.C. 1994) (recognizing in rem foreclosure remedy distinct from personal action on note)
Huntley v. Bortolussi, 667 A.2d 1362 (D.C. 1995) (note and deed of trust are not necessarily a single instrument for limitations purposes)
Logan v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 80 A.3d 1014 (D.C. 2013) (standing and chain-of-title issues may preclude summary disposition and require further development)
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (common-law unconscionability requires examining procedural and substantive circumstances)
Ali v. Tolbert, 636 F.3d 622 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (CPPA targets consumer-merchant relationships; merchant must be connected to supply side of transaction)
Moore v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 124 A.3d 605 (D.C. 2015) (fraud in the factum requires lack of knowledge of an instrument’s true nature)
Chase Plaza Condo. Ass’n v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 98 A.3d 166 (D.C. 2014) (rights under deed of trust follow the note)