Araya v. Keleta
2011 D.C. App. LEXIS 229
D.C.2011Background
- CPO proceedings arose from a physical altercation between Dr. Araya and his wife Aida Keleta; the trial court found she was pregnant and that he assaulted her by pulling and dragging her across a doorway.
- The New Jersey Property, titled solely in Araya, was the married couple’s residence where Keleta lived and performed domestic duties.
- The CPO required Araya to vacate the New Jersey Property for safety concerns.
- Araya argued the property was his sole and separate property acquired before the marriage, thus outside the Act’s vacate authority.
- The trial court concluded the dwelling was a “marital property” for purposes of the Intrafamily Offenses Act despite title, and affirmed the vacate order.
- The appellate court affirmed, construing “marital property” to include the family dwelling regardless of formal ownership and emphasizing liberal construction of the Act to protect safety.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the New Jersey Property falls within the Act’s vacate authority. | Araya: property is sole and separate not subject to vacate. | Keleta: dwelling is marital property for vacate purposes. | Yes; dwelling is marital property for vacate purposes. |
| Whether the term marital property is independent of equitable distribution ownership. | Araya would limit to property subject to §16-916(b). | Court should treat dwelling as marital property notwithstanding title. | Marital property includes the family dwelling regardless of title. |
| Whether the Intrafamily Offenses Act should be liberally construed to prioritize safety over property rights. | Araya adopts narrow interpretation. | Act permits broader protective orders for safety. | Act must be liberally construed to protect safety. |
Key Cases Cited
- Robinson v. Robinson, 886 A.2d 78 (D.C. 2005) (Safety concerns can trump property rights in a totality of the circumstances)
- Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927 (D.C. 1991) (Intrafamily Offenses Act to be read liberally for remedial purpose)
- Sanders v. Sanders, 602 A.2d 663 (D.C. 1992) (Decisions on equity do not control statutory vacate power under the Act)
- Yeldell v. Yeldell, 551 A.2d 832 (D.C. 1988) (Non-purchasing spouse may have equitable interest; not controlling for statutory interpretation here)
- Hemily v. Hemily, 403 A.2d 1139 (D.C. 1979) (Marital property concepts discussed in context of distribution)
- Powell v. Powell, 547 A.2d 973 (D.C. 1988) (Background on liberal construction of protective orders)