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Araujo v. Araujo
493 S.W.3d 232
Tex. App.
2016
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Background

  • Miguel and Yolanda Araujo divorced by agreed decree signed April 21, 2015; decree divided Miguel’s Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) pension but stated portions for Yolanda would be set out in an "Order Dividing Railroad Retirement Benefits to be entered after this Decree."
  • The decree became final on May 21, 2015; no appeal was taken.
  • On June 19, 2015 Yolanda filed a "Motion to Enter" attaching a proposed Railroad Retirement Order; Miguel objected that the trial court lacked plenary and personal jurisdiction to sign a post-judgment QDRO because plenary power had expired.
  • The trial court held a hearing June 25, 2015 and signed the Railroad Retirement Order on July 20, 2015 (59 days after the divorce decree).
  • Miguel appealed, arguing (1) the court lacked plenary power and personal jurisdiction to enter the post-judgment QDRO and (2) he was deprived of due process; the court of appeals reversed and rendered on the plenary-power/QDRO issue.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument (Miguel) Defendant's Argument (Yolanda) Held
Whether the trial court had plenary power to sign the Railroad Retirement Order after the decree became final Court lost plenary power on May 21, 2015; post-judgment QDRO statutes (Fam. Code ch. 9) require a separate petition invoking post-judgment jurisdiction Signing the Railroad Retirement Order was ministerial because the divorce decree already rendered the QDRO and thus the court retained power to sign the implementing order Court held the decree did not render a QDRO; the court lacked plenary power to sign the post-judgment order in the divorce case and reversed the order
Whether signing the Railroad Retirement Order was a mere ministerial act reflecting an already-rendered QDRO N/A (related to primary issue) The decree’s references to an order “to be entered after this Decree” showed intent to provide relief; signing was ministerial Court held the language demonstrated intent to render the QDRO in the future, not a present rendition, so signing was not ministerial
Whether Yolanda invoked post-judgment QDRO procedures under Texas Family Code chapter 9 Miguel: Yolanda failed to file the separate petition and provide citation/answer as required Yolanda: post-judgment QDRO procedures were unnecessary because the decree had already rendered the relief Court held Family Code chapter 9 procedures apply and Yolanda failed to comply; therefore the QDRO was invalid

Key Cases Cited

  • Henry v. Cullum Co., Inc., 891 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995) (discusses rendition, reduction to writing, and signing of judgments)
  • S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1995) (rendition requires present, final decision and words must indicate intent to render judgment then)
  • Samples Exterminators v. Samples, 640 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. 1982) (definition of rendition and judgment effective upon announcement)
  • DeGroot v. DeGroot, 260 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008) (Family Code chapter 9 provides limited post-judgment jurisdiction to create QDROs)
  • In re Marriage of Jones, 154 S.W.3d 225 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005) (section 9.103 allows creation of a QDRO where none exists)
  • James v. Hubbard, 21 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000) (statements showing intent to render judgment in the future are not present renditions)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Araujo v. Araujo
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: May 25, 2016
Citation: 493 S.W.3d 232
Docket Number: No. 04-15-00503-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.