Aransas Project v. Bryan Shaw, 775 F.3d 641

Background

The Aransas Project (TAP), a group formed after elevated whooping-crane deaths in winter 2008–09, sued Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) officials under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), alleging TCEQ water-permitting reduced freshwater inflows to the Guadalupe/San Antonio estuary and caused crane deaths.
Refuge biologist Tom Stehn conducted aerial surveys and the district court accepted his count that 23 cranes died that winter (4 carcasses found; 19 absent from territories), relying heavily on his long-standing methodology.
The district court found TCEQ violated the ESA, enjoined TCEQ from issuing new permits affecting the two rivers (with narrow public-health exception), and ordered TCEQ to seek an incidental-take permit and Habitat Conservation Plan from FWS.
A Fifth Circuit motions panel stayed the injunction pending appeal; the state and intervenors appealed the judgment on liability and remedies.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld TAP’s standing and rejected Burford abstention, but reversed the district court: it held the district court misapplied proximate-cause/foreseeability principles and that, even if liability were proven, the injunction was an abuse of discretion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Article III standing for injunctive relief	TAP claimed ongoing permit issuance and endangered status create imminent future injury to cranes	State argued causal chain and future threat were too speculative to support standing	Court found TAP adequately pleaded standing to proceed and reviewed merits (standing maintained through case)
Burford abstention (federal court should defer to state water regime)	TAP: state remedies inadequate for environmental-flow relief; federal adjudication appropriate	State: water allocation is core state interest, so federal court should abstain	Court declined Burford abstention (factors balanced against abstention given federal ESA interest and apparent lack of adequate state remedy)
Whether TCEQ permits proximately caused crane deaths (ESA "take")	TAP: permits reduced inflows → higher salinity → less food/drink → emaciation and deaths; TCEQ authorization thus caused takes	State: causal chain was remote, attenuated, affected by many independent factors (other users, weather, reservoirs), so foreseeability/proximate cause lacking	Court held district court misapplied proximate-cause law; on record proximate cause and foreseeability were lacking as a matter of law, so no ESA liability
Appropriateness of the permanent injunction	TAP: ESA allows strong equitable relief (relaxed balance of equities) to prevent future takes	State: injunction was overbroad, based on flawed causation and lacked proof of imminent future harm	Court held injunction was an abuse of discretion—district court misapplied the standard and failed to show certain/likely imminent future harm

Key Cases Cited

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (ESA "take" includes habitat modification; foreseeability/proximate-cause limits apply)
Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 (1996) (proximate-cause principles limit liability for remote consequences)
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989) (Burford abstention is narrow; federal courts generally should exercise jurisdiction)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury-in-fact, causation, redressability; must be maintained throughout litigation)
Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (proximate cause bars liability where causal link is highly attenuated)
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (injunctive-relief standards; plaintiff must show likelihood of irreparable harm)
Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991) (permitting/agency action can cause ESA take where connection is direct)
Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997) (state licensing led to takes where licensed activity directly caused harm)