Appleton v. Harrigan
2014 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 45
Supreme Court of The Virgin Is...2014Background
- Harrigan purchased parcels previously owned by Gilbert Appleton and allowed Gilbert and his sons (Austin and Mackchesney) to occupy the property in exchange for monthly payments of $2,100; payments stopped in 2008.
- Harrigan sued (via counterclaim) for unpaid rent; Gilbert and Mackchesney failed to answer and defaults were entered against them.
- Superior Court conducted a bench trial on Austin’s contract claim and, effectively consolidated with it, determined liability and damages against Gilbert and Mackchesney, awarding Harrigan $48,912.43 for unpaid rent.
- Mackchesney, pro se, moved post-judgment to set aside the default (styled a motion for new trial), claiming lack of proper service, lack of notice he remained a party, denial of due process, and inability to participate at trial.
- Superior Court denied relief under Rule 60(b)(1), finding Mackchesney was properly served, attended pretrial, was given opportunities to participate at trial, and admitted liability by default; Mackchesney appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Harrigan) | Defendant's Argument (Mackchesney) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Superior Court abused discretion in denying post-judgment relief from default | Default should stand; damages established at consolidated proceeding | Relief required because Mackchesney was not properly served/notified and thus denied due process | Denial affirmed: Mackchesney was properly served, attended pretrial, and failed to timely respond; Rule 60(b)(1) relief not warranted |
| Whether default precludes contesting liability (agency defense) | Default admits well-pleaded allegations of liability | Mackchesney argued he acted only as agent for Gilbert, not personally liable | Default admitted liability; agency defense precluded by default |
| Whether damages required separate default-judgment hearing or were a "sum certain" permitting clerk judgment | Harrigan argued consolidation and trial evidence adequately proved damages | Mackchesney contended he was entitled to separate hearing and to contest amount | Damages were not a "sum certain," but court reasonably consolidated the damage determination with the bench trial and afforded Mackchesney opportunity to participate; no prejudice shown |
| Whether Rule 14/other procedural defects invalidated counterclaim | Harrigan: counterclaim was direct, not a third-party complaint under Rule 14 | Mackchesney: counterclaim procedurally defective under Rule 14 | Waived because not raised below; meritless in any event because Rule 14 governs third-party complaints, not direct counterclaims |
Key Cases Cited
- Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1975) (defaulting party is bound by well-pleaded factual allegations and barred from contesting them)
- Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Metro Found. Contractors Inc., 699 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2012) (default concedes liability but not damages)
- Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1992) (damages following default generally require evidentiary proof unless for a sum certain)
- KPS & Assocs., Inc. v. Designs By FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining ‘‘sum certain’’ concept and when damages may be determined without extrinsic proof)
- Malloy v. Reyes, 61 V.I. 163 (V.I. 2014) (final judgment jurisdictional standard)