Appeal of Tradz, LLC
2021-0053
| N.H. | Apr 8, 2022Background
- Tradz, LLC (towing/repo company) applied for titles to 10 vehicles it towed and later sold to itself at public auction, claiming they were abandoned under RSA 262:40-a.
- Six vehicles were towed at the request of lienholders (repossessions); three were towed from a Concord dealership; one was towed from the owner’s property in Massachusetts.
- Tradz asserts it complied with the notice provisions and that owners/lienholders did not reclaim vehicles or pay fees, so the abandoned-vehicle process and disposal provisions applied.
- The DMV denied title applications: repossessed vehicles are governed by repossession law (not abandoned-vehicle statute); dealership removals lacked property-owner authorization; Massachusetts removal implicated out-of-state property-law limits.
- The Department of Safety Bureau of Hearings affirmed the DMV; Tradz appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Tradz) | Defendant's Argument (DMV) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does RSA 262:40-a (abandoned-vehicle statute) apply to vehicles repossessed at lienholder's direction? | Repossessed vehicles can also qualify as abandoned; statute does not preclude overlap. | Repossession and abandoned-vehicle removal are mutually exclusive; lienholder sought to obtain possession under repossession law (RSA 259:87-a). | Court: Repossession is different; statute does not apply to these six repossessed vehicles. |
| If repossessed vehicles later sit unclaimed on the tow yard, may Tradz use abandoned-vehicle disposal provisions to sell them to itself and obtain title? | Even if vehicles later became "apparently abandoned," Tradz may invoke abandoned-vehicle disposal provisions after notice and auction procedures. | Disposal provisions (RSA 262:36-a, :37) apply only to vehicles removed/stored pursuant to the abandoned-vehicle subdivision; they do not authorize sale of repossessed vehicles. | Court: Disposal provisions do not authorize selling repossessed vehicles to oneself; Tradz cannot obtain title under abandoned-vehicle scheme. |
| Were the three dealership tows authorized by the property owner so as to trigger RSA 262:40-a? | Tradz says a former sales manager authorized the tow and provided factory keys. | DMV investigation showed dealership denied authorizing the tow; use of another towing company; inability to show lawful possession. | Court: Evidence supported bureau finding that dealership did not authorize removal; abandoned-vehicle statute did not apply. |
| Does RSA 262:40-a apply to vehicles removed from property located outside New Hampshire? | Tradz argues owner abandoned vehicle on her Massachusetts property, so statute should apply once vehicle is in NH tow yard. | State law governs property within its borders; RSA 262:40-a cannot reach out-of-state removals. | Court: Statute does not apply to removals from out-of-state property; Tradz cannot rely on it for the Massachusetts tow. |
Key Cases Cited
- Appeal of Brown, 171 N.H. 468 (2018) (agency fact-findings presumed prima facie lawful; appellate review limited to competent evidence)
- Sivalingam v. Newton, 174 N.H. 489 (2021) (statutory interpretation principles; focus on plain meaning)
- Appeal of Liberty Assembly of God, 163 N.H. 622 (2012) (deference to agency credibility determinations)
- Hogan v. Pat's Peak Skiing, LLC, 168 N.H. 71 (2015) (courts avoid statutory constructions that produce absurd results)
- Clark v. Tarbell, 58 N.H. 88 (1877) (each state has jurisdiction over property within its territorial limits)