346 P.3d 21
Wyo.2015Background
- Apodaca alleged harassment, emotional distress, personal injury, loss of income, and age discrimination against Safeway.
- District court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
- EEOC charge was filed in 2013 alleging age discrimination, but the EEOC deemed it untimely.
- Apodaca last worked for Safeway on December 21, 2012; charge filed November 13, 2013, exceeding the 300-day window under ADEA pre-suit exhaustion.
- Court held ADEA exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite; untimeliness bars federal discrimination claims.
- State-law claims (emotional distress, personal injury, loss of income) were preempted or inadequately argued and were summarily affirmed against Apodaca.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Apodaca's ADEA claims were timely and properly exhausted. | Apodaca contends timely exhaustion; time frames satisfied. | Safeway argues untimeliness and lack of administrative exhaustion. | ADEA exhaustion not satisfied; claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
| Whether state-law claims were properly dismissed given potential LMRA preemption. | Apodaca did not adequately argue, cite authorities to support state claims. | CBA preemption under LMRA may apply; need cogent argument. | State-law claims summarily affirmed without merit due to lack of cogent argument. |
Key Cases Cited
- Almond v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, 665 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2011) (administrative exhaustion as a jurisdictional prerequisite under the ADEA)
- Shikles v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 426 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 2005) (exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under the ADEA)
- Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007) (exhaustion requirements are a condition precedent to suit)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (preemption of state-law claims under §301 LMRA when they involve interpretation of labor agreements)
- Saunders v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 927 F.2d 1154 (10th Cir. 1991) (preemption considerations under LMRA §301)
