Anwar v. Dow Chemical Co.
876 F.3d 841
6th Cir.2017Background
- Rose Anwar, a U.S. citizen, worked for MEG International in Dubai and was promoted to CIO; she alleges sex and marital-status discrimination by supervisor Ramesh Ramachandran and was terminated in 2014 after initiating divorce proceedings.
- Anwar sued in Michigan federal court (against MEG International/MEG Americas, Ramachandran, and Dow) asserting Title VII, Michigan ELCRA, and contract/promissory-estoppel claims based on alleged discrimination and joint-employer/alter-ego theories.
- MEG International moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (and other defenses); the district court limited discovery to jurisdictional issues and later dismissed MEG International for lack of personal jurisdiction.
- Dow argued it was not Anwar’s employer (or joint employer) and moved to dismiss/for summary judgment; the district court granted summary judgment for Dow on Title VII and ELCRA claims and dismissed the remaining contract-based claims.
- Anwar sought additional discovery (two former-employee depositions and written discovery) and Rule 56(d) relief; the district court denied those requests and entered the dispositive rulings. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personal jurisdiction over MEG International via alter-ego/doing-business-as MEG Americas | Anwar: MEG International and MEG Americas operate as a single enterprise (shared board members, financing role, common website and business) so Michigan courts can exercise jurisdiction | MEG Int’l: entities are separate; MEG Int’l is a Dubai entity and not the alter ego of Michigan-registered MEG Americas | Held: Dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction affirmed; Anwar failed to make a prima facie showing of the required unity of ownership/control under federal and Michigan law |
| Forum non conveniens (alternative) | Anwar: Michigan is an appropriate forum for her federal/state claims | MEG Int’l: case should be litigated in Dubai; forum non conveniens is appropriate | Held: Court did not reach forum non conveniens because dismissal on jurisdictional grounds was affirmed |
| Dow’s liability as joint employer under Title VII and ELCRA | Anwar: Dow exercised control over her employment through seconded managers (Ramachandran and Freisler) who were employed by Dow subsidiaries | Dow: Although managers were seconded, Dow did not control the manner and means of Anwar’s work and was not her employer | Held: Summary judgment for Dow affirmed; Anwar failed to show sufficient interrelated operations or control to establish joint-employer/single-employer status under federal and Michigan tests |
| Denial of additional discovery / protective order | Anwar: additional depositions and written discovery were necessary to oppose dismissal/summary judgment and to support Rule 56(d) request | Defendants: the district court had narrowly limited discovery to jurisdictional questions; sought discovery was irrelevant/unduly burdensome | Held: Protective order and denial of further discovery affirmed as within the district court’s discretion; Anwar did not show the proposed discovery was likely to change the result |
Key Cases Cited
- MAG IAS Holdings, Inc. v. Schmückle, 854 F.3d 894 (6th Cir. 2017) (standard of review and procedure for personal-jurisdiction dismissal)
- Estate of Thomson ex rel. Estate of Rakestraw v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2008) (alter-ego theory for personal jurisdiction; factors to assess unity of enterprise)
- Indah v. U.S. S.E.C., 661 F.3d 914 (6th Cir. 2011) (application of alter-ego theory in the Sixth Circuit)
- Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2015) (clarifies federal alter-ego test requiring pervasive control beyond macromanagement)
- Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983) (factors for parent/subsidiary single-employer analysis under Title VII)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for genuine dispute on summary judgment)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (movant’s initial burden on summary judgment)
