Antyane Robinson v. Jeffrey Beard
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15416
| 3rd Cir. | 2014Background
- In June 1996 Robinson shot Tara Hodge (wounding her) and Rashawn Bass (killing him) at Hodge’s apartment; evidence included guns, photos, and prior offenses.\
- A jury convicted Robinson of first-degree murder and related offenses; during penalty phase the prosecutor emphasized Robinson’s "big city" image and past violence; defense requested a Simmons parole-ineligibility instruction which the trial court denied.\
- The jury found two aggravators: (1) knowingly creating a grave risk of death to another in addition to the victim (Pa. Stat. § 9711(d)(7)); and (2) murder in perpetration of a felony; it found two mitigators and returned a death sentence.\
- Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal; Robinson’s PCRA petition was denied and the state supreme court declined further review of some claims as previously litigated.\
- Robinson filed a federal habeas petition raising (inter alia) (A) failure to give a Simmons instruction and (B) insufficiency and vagueness of the "grave risk" aggravator; the District Court denied relief and the Third Circuit affirmed.\
- The Third Circuit applied AEDPA deference where appropriate, declined to apply Kelly v. South Carolina retroactively to alter the state court’s Simmons analysis, and reviewed the grave-risk instruction and sufficiency claims (sufficiency under AEDPA; instruction de novo).
Issues
| Issue | Robinson's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court erred by refusing Simmons parole-ineligibility instruction | Prosecutor’s characterizations and evidence of past violence argued future dangerousness; jury should have been told life = life without parole | Prosecutor only emphasized past conduct and deterrence; did not argue defendant posed continuing danger requiring Simmons instruction | Denied: state court reasonably concluded prosecution did not expressly argue future dangerousness; AEDPA deference supports affirmance |
| Whether Kelly v. South Carolina alters Simmons analysis for this case | Kelly should be applied to show parole instruction required even for implications of future dangerousness | Kelly arguably broadened Simmons and post-dates the state-court decision; cannot be applied retroactively under AEDPA | Denied: Court declined to apply Kelly retroactively; Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s limiting rule was reasonable |
| Sufficiency of evidence for § 9711(d)(7) ("grave risk") aggravator | Hodge was shot before Bass and in a different room; no sufficient nexus during commission of murder to create grave risk to her | Evidence showed Hodge attempted to block entry, was unconscious nearby when Robinson fired seven shots at Bass, and bullets passed through the wall—jurors could infer ricochet/pass-through risk | Denied: Evidence was sufficient; Pennsylvania court reasonably found a nexus and zone-of-danger linking Hodge to Bass’s killing |
| Whether § 9711(d)(7) or the jury instruction was unconstitutionally vague/overbroad | Statute/instruction lacks limiting guidance and risks arbitrary application | Text mirrors statute; has common-sense core and juries can apply it; Supreme Court precedent upholds similar factors | Denied: Aggravator not unconstitutionally vague as-applied; instruction sufficiently tracked statute |
Key Cases Cited
- Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (plurality holding due process may require parole-ineligibility instruction when prosecution argues future dangerousness)
- Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (parole-ineligibility instruction required where evidence or argument accentuates implication of future dangerousness)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
- Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (aggravating factor must narrow class of death-eligible defendants and not be unconstitutionally vague)
- Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (capital sentencing procedures and potential vagueness concerns with aggravating factors)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (AEDPA’s deferential standard and limits on federal review)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (definition of "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" under AEDPA)