Antoun v. Shelly Co.
2017 Ohio 4387
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Claimant Ronald Antoun was injured in a 2012 work-related vehicle accident; the Industrial Commission allowed cervical and lumbar sprains and later cervical disc displacement C5-C6.
- The Shelly Company (employer) appealed the Industrial Commission's allowance to the common pleas court under R.C. 4123.512; claimant must file the complaint in court even when employer initiates appeal.
- After discovery and delays, Antoun moved to voluntarily dismiss his common pleas complaint on December 21, 2015, citing Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) (notice) and alternatively Civ.R. 41(A)(2) (motion for court-ordered dismissal); the employer opposed.
- R.C. 4123.512(D) (the "Consent Provision") provides that when the employer files the notice of appeal, "the claimant may not dismiss the complaint without the employer's consent."
- The trial court granted Antoun’s dismissal (citing Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a)); the employer and BWC appealed. The majority reversed, holding the statute supersedes Civ.R. 41(A)(1) and (2) in employer-initiated workers’ compensation appeals; dissent argued the statute does not bar court-ordered dismissal under Civ.R. 41(A)(2).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 4123.512(D) bars a claimant from unilaterally dismissing an employer-initiated workers’ compensation appeal by filing a Civ.R. 41(A)(1) notice | Antoun initially argued Ferguson invalidated the Consent Provision and alternatively relied on Civ.R. 41(A)(2) (court-ordered dismissal) | Employer/BWC: statute bars dismissals without employer consent under both Civ.R. 41(A)(1) and (2) | Court: Civ.R. 41(A)(1) is inapplicable; statute prohibits unilateral notices of dismissal in employer appeals |
| Whether R.C. 4123.512(D) precludes a court-ordered voluntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(A)(2) when the employer objects | Antoun argued judicial action (A)(2) is different from unilateral A(1) and not barred by the statute | Employer/BWC contended the Consent Provision applies to A(2) too and dismissal requires employer consent | Court: Civ.R. 41(A)(2) is also inapplicable under Civ.R. 1(C)(8); the statute supersedes the rule and a claimant may not obtain dismissal without employer consent |
| Whether the court should decide constitutional challenges to R.C. 4123.512(D) (separation of powers, etc.) | Antoun preserved separation-of-powers challenge to the statute as applied to Civ.R. 41(A)(2) | Employer defended statute as constitutional | Court: declined to reach constitutional questions because statutory/rule interpretation resolved case |
| Proper remedy for trial court's grant of dismissal | Antoun sought dismissal without prejudice | Employer sought reversal and remand for merits adjudication | Court: reversed trial court and remanded for adjudication on the merits (majority); dissent would have affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Superior Foundry, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 168 Ohio St. 537 (1959) (describing workers’ compensation statutory scheme and employer experience rating)
- Arth Brass & Aluminum Castings, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 104 Ohio St.3d 547 (2004) (holding State cannot charge employer risk account until final determination)
- Zuljevic v. Midland-Ross Corp., 62 Ohio St.2d 116 (1979) (claimant must re-establish entitlement in common pleas court despite administrative allowance)
- Thorton v. Montville Plastics & Rubber, Inc., 121 Ohio St.3d 124 (2009) (R.C. 4123.512(D) prevents claimant from unilaterally dismissing employer-initiated administrative appeal)
- Myers v. Toledo, 110 Ohio St.3d 218 (2006) (workers’ compensation appeal is a special statutory proceeding)
- Price v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 70 Ohio St.2d 131 (1982) (civil rules clearly inapplicable when their use would alter basic statutory purpose)
- State ex rel. Fowler v. Smith, 68 Ohio St.3d 357 (1994) (where statute prescribes different procedure from civil rules, statute controls)