Antonio Vashon Smith v. State of Mississippi
196 So. 3d 986
| Miss. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Smith pleaded guilty (Alford plea) in 2006 to fondling; sexual-battery count dismissed; court suspended a 10-year sentence and imposed 5 years supervised probation and fines/fees.
- First revocation (2007): probation revoked after Smith admitted failing to reregister as a sex offender; court ordered one year incarceration and left nine years suspended.
- Second revocation (2009): Smith, unrepresented, admitted further registration failures and fee nonpayment; court revoked remaining suspended sentence and ordered incarceration for the balance.
- Smith filed a postconviction-relief (PCR) motion in 2012 raising double jeopardy, entitlement to an evidentiary hearing, ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of counsel at the second revocation, and involuntariness of plea.
- The Clarke County Circuit Court summarily dismissed the PCR; Smith appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding procedural bars and that the claims lacked merit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Smith) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Double jeopardy from second revocation | Second revocation and reinstatement of sentence violated double jeopardy/due process | Revocation and reinstatement of suspended portions is authorized and not a new punishment | Rejected — court may revoke and reinstate remaining suspended sentence; no double jeopardy |
| Right to evidentiary hearing on PCR | Record disputes (e.g., not told sentence would be day-for-day; probation officer would speak; fee payments) warranted a hearing | Claims contradicted by record and unsupported by affidavits; court may summarily dismiss meritless PCRs | Rejected — summary dismissal proper; no unresolved factual issues requiring a hearing |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (at plea/sentencing/first revocation) | Counsel failed to challenge sexual-battery allegations, failed to advise about day-for-day service, and failed to invoke registration-law protections | Claims time-barred under UPCCRA; record shows counsel challenged charges, plea was knowing, and Smith satisfied with counsel | Rejected — mostly time-barred; on the merits claims fail under Strickland and are contradicted by record |
| Denial of counsel and due-process at second revocation | Absence of counsel likely led to revocation; hearing complex enough to require counsel | No per se right to counsel at revocation; issues were straightforward (registration and fee nonpayment); Smith had notice, opportunity to be heard, cross-examine, and present evidence | Rejected — due-process requirements satisfied; appointment of counsel not required given the simple issues |
| Voluntariness of plea | Plea was not knowing/voluntary (reiterating earlier complaints) | Claim is time-barred and, in any event, plea colloquy and petition show a voluntary, informed Alford plea | Rejected — time-barred and contradicted by sworn plea colloquy and documents |
Key Cases Cited
- North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (guilty plea may be accepted despite protestations of innocence when defendant intelligently concludes trial risk favors plea)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (minimum due-process protections for parole revocation proceedings)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (adopts Morrissey protections for probation revocation and discusses counsel appointment)
- Rowland v. State, 42 So. 3d 503 (Miss. 2010) (standard of review and procedural bars in PCR context)
- Edwards v. State, 123 So. 3d 936 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (court authority to reinstate suspended sentences)
- Pruitt v. State, 953 So. 2d 302 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (no per se right to counsel at revocation; court discretion)
- Burrough v. State, 9 So. 3d 368 (Miss. 2009) (in guilty-plea context, defendant must show he would have insisted on trial but for counsel's errors)