Antonio v. SSA Security, Inc., 110 A.3d 654

Two SSA security guards (Aaron Speed and William Fitzpatrick) and confederates conspired to commit large-scale arson in a Maryland subdivision; fires destroyed and damaged multiple homes.
Speed had prior disciplinary problems, was rehired despite a recommendation against rehire, left his post while on-duty to stash fuel and created a map identifying minority-owned/contracted houses.
Plaintiffs sued SSA in federal court asserting, among other claims, that Md. Code, Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 19-501 (Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501) imposed strict/vicarious liability on SSA for employees’ on-duty criminal acts.
The district court granted summary judgment for SSA, holding § 19-501 codified, not expanded, respondeat superior; the Fourth Circuit certified the statutory-interpretation question to the Maryland Court of Appeals.
The certified question: whether § 19-501 imposes liability beyond common-law respondeat superior so that an employer may be liable for off-duty criminal acts planned in part while the employee was on duty.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does § 19-501 impose vicarious liability broader than common-law respondeat superior (i.e., all acts committed while on-duty)?	§ 19-501 is temporal: agencies are strictly liable for all acts employees commit while "conducting the business of the agency" (i.e., on-duty).	§ 19-501 codifies common-law respondeat superior and does not expand employer liability beyond acts within the scope of employment.	Court held § 19-501 codifies respondeat superior and does not abrogate or broaden common-law vicarious liability.

Barclay v. Briscoe, 427 Md. 270, 47 A.3d 560 (Md. 2012) (defines employer liability under scope-of-employment/respondeat superior principles)
Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966 (Md. 1982) (articulates scope-of-employment standard for respondeat superior)
Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 801 A.2d 160 (Md. 2002) (statutory interpretation principle: ascertain legislative intent from text first)
Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 935 A.2d 731 (Md. 2007) (presumption against statutory abrogation of the common law unless Legislature’s intent is clear)
Oaks v. Conners, 339 Md. 24, 660 A.2d 423 (Md. 1995) (if statutory language is unambiguous, courts apply plain meaning)
Stewart Warner Corp. v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (example of another jurisdiction interpreting similar statutory language to impose broad on-duty liability)
Apex Smelting Co. v. Burns, 175 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1949) (federal case discussed as context for later statutory responses in other states)