Antonio Smith v. State of Indiana, 2015 Ind. LEXIS 567

December 2012 Dollar General burglary captured on security video; ~$3,500 taken; burglar masked and gloved; video showed portions of the perpetrator’s backside and appeared Caucasian.
Store manager Nicole Greenlee (who had keys, alarm and safe codes) gave multiple, inconsistent statements to police: at times she admitted she acted alone; at other times she implicated Antonio Smith as the person who entered while she acted as lookout.
Greenlee pleaded guilty to burglary in state court; plea colloquy contained admissions that she entered the store and took the money but did not mention Smith.
At Smith’s trial the State called Greenlee (granted use immunity), cell‑tower/call records matching calls between Greenlee and Smith during the burglary, and an officer who observed Smith driving a white car days later.
Defense emphasized Greenlee’s inconsistent sworn statements and argued the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony and that Greenlee’s testimony was incredibly dubious given the video; jury convicted Smith of Class C burglary (the verdict did not specify principal vs accomplice theory).
Indiana Court of Appeals reversed; Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the conviction.

Issue	State's Argument	Smith's Argument	Held
Whether the prosecution knowingly used perjured/false testimony in violation of due process	The State disclosed Greenlee’s inconsistent sworn statements, highlighted discrepancies at trial, and left credibility to the jury; it did not knowingly use false testimony	Greenlee’s trial testimony that Smith entered the store directly contradicted her sworn plea colloquy; the State impermissibly relied on one sworn version over another, amounting to use of perjury to obtain conviction	No due‑process violation. The State did not impair the jury’s fact‑finding; inconsistencies were presented and argued to the jury, so reversal not required
Whether Greenlee’s testimony was so incredible (incredible dubiosity) that it must be disregarded, leaving insufficient evidence	The State: incredible‑dubiosity rule applies narrowly; here circumstantial evidence (calls, tower data, car sighting, recorded call) corroborated elements and jury could credit Greenlee	Greenlee’s identification of Smith (African‑American) conflicts with video appearance (appeared Caucasian); absent Greenlee, no evidence ties Smith to burglary	Incredible dubiosity inapplicable. Greenlee’s testimony was not internally contradictory; circumstantial evidence existed; credibility and weight were for the jury

Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (due process violated when prosecution obtains conviction by deliberate deception via known perjured testimony)
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942) (habeas relief available where imprisonment results from perjured testimony knowingly used by state authorities)
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecution’s knowing use of false testimony violates Fourteenth Amendment even if not solicited)
Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (prosecutor’s allowance of false testimony that suppresses evidence corroborating defense violates due process)
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (conviction obtained by deliberate misrepresentation of truth by prosecution is unconstitutional)
Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749 (Ind. 2015) (describing narrow three‑part incredible‑dubiosity test: sole witness, inherently contradictory/coerced testimony, and absence of circumstantial evidence)