Antonio Pearson v. Secretary Department of Correc
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 247
| 3rd Cir. | 2015Background
- Pearson, a life-term prisoner in Pennsylvania, alleges a two-year pattern of harassment by prison staff in retaliation for his civil actions and grievances.
- Starting in 2006, Pearson filed a prior civil action and multiple grievances through 2007 alleging cell searches, retaliation, and denial of grievance paperwork.
- In 2008 Pearson was assigned to and then removed from a blockworker position allegedly due to his grievances, with unit management citing retaliation.
- Pearson filed a § 1983 complaint on February 28, 2009, later amended, with the District Court ruling certain pre-March 1, 2007 claims time-barred under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations.
- A magistrate judge ruled that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is not a statutory tolling provision under Pennsylvania law, and the court did not apply equitable tolling.
- On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the PLRA is a statutory prohibition tolling Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations while a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies and remanded for a tolling determination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does PA tolling law apply to PLRA exhaustion? | Pearson argues tolling should occur during exhaustion under PLRA. | Merely exhaustion decisions should not toll under PA statute. | PLRA tolls during exhaustion; Pennsylvania tolling applies. |
| Is PLRA a statutory prohibition under PA tolling statute? | PLRA constitutes a statutory prohibition that tolls limitations. | PLRA is not a statutory prohibition; exhaustion is state-run matter. | PLRA is a statutory prohibition; tolling applies. |
| Should Pearson’s retaliatory discharge claim be dismissed at 12(b)(6) or proceed? | Allegations show retaliatory motivation; plausible claim survives. | Temporal proximity alone insufficient; no plausible causal link shown. | Plaintiff pled plausible retaliation; claim survives to proceed. |
| Remand analysis: determine exhaustion and tolling scope for timely/untimely claims | If exhausted, tolling period should be applied to timeliness of claims. | District Court should determine exhaustion first; limited findings. | Case remanded for exhaustion and tolling determinations; discovery for retaliation if exhausted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pressley v. Huber, 562 F. App’x 67 (3d Cir. 2014) (exhaustion tolls statute of limitations under PLRA)
- Paluch v. Secretary Pa. Dep’t Corr., 442 F. App’x 690 (3d Cir. 2011) (exhaustion tolls under PLRA)
- Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 2001) (Illinois tolling statute applies to PLRA exhaustion)
- Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153 (5th Cir. 1999) (Louisiana-like tolling supports tolling during exhaustion)
- Vantassel v. Rozum, 469 F. App’x 110 (3d Cir. 2012) (tolling discussion in district court context)
- Gonzalez v. Hasty, 651 F.3d 318 (2d Cir. 2011) (tolling considerations across circuits)
- Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2005) (federal equitable tolling principles)
- Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2006) (pleading standards; Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility)