Antonio Parra Perez v. State, 562 S.W.3d 676

Antonio Parra Perez, convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual assault and three counts of indecency with a child (his granddaughters Ana and Brianna); sentences included two life terms and three consecutive 20-year terms.
Ana and Brianna (ages 5–8 at time of abuse) gave detailed accounts at trial and in forensic interviews, and SANEs testified about hymenal notches consistent with the alleged abuse.
The State called Perez’s sisters, Stacy and Tina, who testified that Perez sexually abused them as children in the 1960s; defense objected as improper extraneous-offense evidence.
The trial court admitted the sisters’ testimony under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37 §2 after out-of-court hearings and a Rule 403 balancing; the jury received a limiting instruction on extraneous-offense evidence.
The State also presented expert testimony from a licensed sex-offender treatment provider (Jennifer Edwards) about general child-sex-abuse dynamics and common offender characteristics; defense objected that the testimony was irrelevant to Perez specifically.
On appeal Perez challenged (1) the constitutionality of art. 38.37 §2, (2) admission of his sisters’ testimony (both §2 adequacy and Rule 403), and (3) admission of Edwards’s expert testimony. The court affirmed overall, finding art. 38.37 §2 constitutional, harmless Rule 403 error as to the sisters’ testimony, and proper admission of the expert testimony.

Issue	Perez's Argument	State's Argument	Held
1) Is art. 38.37 §2 facially unconstitutional for allowing propensity/extraneous-offense evidence?	§2 is overly broad, circumvents evidentiary rules, violates due process and right to impartial jury.	§2 is constitutional; contains procedural safeguards (notice, §2-a hearing); analogous to Fed. R. Evid. 414.	Court: §2 constitutional; no fundamental-right violation and safeguards exist.
2) Did the trial court err in admitting Stacy’s and Tina’s testimony under §2 and Rule 403?	Their testimony was too remote (1960s), uncorroborated, lacked intervening misconduct; Rule 403 prejudice outweighed probative value.	§2 hearings showed testimony adequate to support finding beyond a reasonable doubt; similarities to charged offenses increase probative value.	Court: §2 admissibility proper (testimony adequate); but trial court abused discretion under Rule 403 (remoteness, lack of intervening acts, prosecutor emphasis). Error found harmless.
3) Was Edwards’s expert testimony inadmissible because it lacked a case-specific application?	Edwards did not evaluate Perez, admitted no profile exists, gave only general characteristics—improper and irrelevant.	Testimony provided specialized, helpful jury education about abuse dynamics and offender behavior and connected sufficiently to case facts.	Court: Admission within trial court’s discretion; testimony sufficiently linked and helpful (Duckett controls over Williams).

Williams v. State, 895 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (expert testimony must be connected or applied to facts of the individual case to be helpful)
Duckett v. State, 797 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (expert testimony on child‑abuse dynamics may be admitted to assist jury and can be applied to case particulars)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (due‑process standard: State must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt)
Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (presumption of legislative validity in statutory challenges)
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (standard for determining whether error was harmless or affected substantial rights)