Antonio Caballero v. Leonardo Gonzalez Dellan, 23-14051

Background

Antonio Caballero obtained a substantial judgment under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) against FARC for the murder of his father.
Due to the difficulty of collecting directly from a terrorist organization, Caballero sought the turnover of assets alleged to be held by FARC agents or instrumentalities, including Leonardo González Dellan.
The district court, relying on an expert declaration and applying OFAC sanctions evidence, found González to be an agent or instrumentality of FARC and ordered turnover of his assets; González settled and voluntarily dismissed his appeal.
Later, two others—Gorrín and Perdomo—challenged similar findings, ultimately convincing the court that the evidence connecting them to FARC was insufficient, leading to summary judgment in their favor.
Upon seeing this result, González sought relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), arguing the different outcomes for similarly situated parties should apply to him as well; the district court denied relief.
González appealed that denial to the Eleventh Circuit.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether González should receive relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) in light of summary judgment granted to similarly situated defendants	Caballero argued that González failed to show extraordinary circumstances or extreme hardship, having already settled and waived further challenge	González argued it is unfair for him to be treated differently than Gorrín/Perdomo given the later findings; asserted substantial harm from being labeled FARC agent	Denied Rule 60(b)(6) relief: González failed to show extreme hardship and had voluntarily dismissed his appeal, waiving further challenge
Whether the later summary judgment for others undermines the earlier agency/instrumentality determination as to González	Caballero maintained there were procedural differences—González had settled and dismissed appeal, others continued litigating	González argued the subsequent summary judgment for others should retroactively apply to him	Court found González's voluntary dismissal of appeal and non-objection were dispositive; no abuse of discretion
Whether failure to argue hardship below precluded relief on appeal	Caballero pointed out González did not raise arguments about hardship before the lower court	González tried to argue hardship for the first time on appeal	Court held the issue was forfeited as González failed to argue it in the district court
Whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief is available where a party has voluntarily abandoned appellate options	Caballero relied on precedent holding Rule 60(b)(6) not intended to relieve deliberate, strategic choices	González argued he vigorously defended himself prior to appeal dismissal	Court held Rule 60(b)(6) does not allow relief from the consequences of voluntary, deliberate litigation decisions

Key Cases Cited

Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom., 771 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2014) (discussing execution against agency or instrumentality under TRIA)
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 741 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2014) (setting standards for granting Rule 60(b)(6) relief and the effect of voluntarily abandoning appeals)
Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677 (11th Cir. 1984) (Rule 60(b)(6) requires extreme and unexpected hardship)
Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1111 (11th Cir. 1993) (Rule 60(b) motion cannot substitute for timely appeal)
Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004) (issues not raised in the district court cannot be raised on appeal)