Antoinette Burns v. Matthew Levy
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 19969
| D.C. Cir. | 2017Background
- Antoinette Burns, an Air Force physician, entered a Georgetown research fellowship involving separate agreements: Air Force–University, Burns–University, University–Hospital, and Burns–Hospital.
- Burns claims she voluntarily withdrew from the University research fellowship (with a December 11, 2012 letter confirming an April 3, 2012 effective withdrawal), while Hospital personnel later reported to the Air Force that she had been dismissed for cause.
- Hospital supervisors (Levy and Padmore) and a University chair (Nelson) held dual roles at the Hospital and University; termination communications used both institutions’ letterhead.
- Burns sued in diversity for breach of contract, defamation, and tortious interference after the Hospital and Levy reported her as terminated to the Air Force.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on all counts; the D.C. Circuit affirmed contract and tortious-interference rulings but reversed and remanded the defamation claims for factual disputes about falsity and the defendants’ knowledge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Breach of contract — who could terminate | Burns: the separate written instruments together formed one unified fellowship; she resigned that unified fellowship, so any later hospital report of termination breached the contracts | Defs: contracts unambiguously allocate rights and duties separately to University and Hospital; Hospital was not bound by University termination procedures | Court: Contracts are unambiguous; Hospital not contractually bound to Burns’s University procedures; summary judgment for defendants on contract claims affirmed |
| Defamation — truth of reports to Air Force | Burns: Hospital/Levy falsely reported she was dismissed for cause after she had resigned; those statements were false and defamatory | Defs: reports were privileged (common-interest and/or peer-review) and made in good faith about a legitimate disciplinary action | Court: Genuine factual dispute exists whether Hospital had authority to dismiss and whether statements were false or known to be false; summary judgment improper as to defamation — reversed and remanded |
| Privilege — common-interest vs. peer-review standard for malice | Burns: privileges require proof of knowledge or reckless disregard depending on privilege; she need not face an insurmountable bar at summary judgment | Defs: common-interest and peer-review privileges bar liability absent malice (reckless or knowing falsity); if peer-review applies, plaintiff must show knowledge of falsity | Court: Common-interest privilege requires reasonable belief in truth; peer-review statute requires actual knowledge of falsity (a higher bar). Applicability of peer-review statute and sufficiency of plaintiff’s proof are factual questions for remand |
| Tortious interference — damages and expectancy | Burns: adverse reports reduced promotion prospects (economic expectancy) supporting interference claim | Defs: alleged expectancy and damages are speculative; Burns lacks a terminated business expectancy causing damage | Court: No actionable damages shown (promotion speculative); summary judgment for defendants affirmed on tortious-interference claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Dyer v. Bilaal, 983 A.2d 349 (D.C. 2009) (objective contract interpretation; honor ordinary meaning of contract terms)
- Fort Lincoln Civic Assoc. v. Fort Lincoln New Town Corp., 944 A.2d 1055 (D.C. 2008) (courts will not create ambiguity where contract language is clear)
- Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011 (D.C. 1990) (common-interest privilege and malice standard for defamation)
- Rosen v. Am. Israel Pub. Affairs Committee, Inc., 41 A.3d 1250 (D.C. 2012) (discussion of privilege and requisite good-faith belief in truth)
- Superior Oil Co. v. Udall, 409 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (multiple documents can form a contract by incorporation)
- Keepseagle v. Perdue, 856 F.3d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (appellate courts generally decline to consider claims not raised below)
- The Cuneo Law Firm Grp., P.C. v. Joseph, 669 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C. 2009) (effect of settlement/withdrawal on original contract claims)