Antoine Lamont Johnson v. United States, 2:16-cv-03419

Background

On March 1, 2004, Johnson and co-defendants (members of the “Hoovers”) committed an armed robbery of an armored truck in Los Angeles; guards were shot and Evelio Suarez, Jr. was killed. DNA and physical evidence (wig, gloves) linked Johnson to the scene; a cooperating witness (Dunagan) testified Johnson confessed.
Indicted on Hobbs Act conspiracy and robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and a § 924(c) count for using/discharging a firearm causing death; a jury convicted Johnson on all counts and the district court sentenced him to consecutive 240-month terms and life on the § 924(c) count. Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Post-appeal, Johnson filed an amended § 2255 motion seeking to vacate the § 924(c) conviction and underlying convictions on ineffective assistance grounds. He argued (1) § 924(c) could have rested on Hobbs Act conspiracy (an invalid predicate if the residual clause is void) or on robbery (which he argued is not a crime of violence under the Force Clause); and (2) trial counsel were ineffective for (a) failing to prevent admission of out-of-court statements by a now-unavailable witness (Burgess) and (b) failing to present alibi/impeachment evidence to rebut Dunagan.
Burgess had identified Johnson as attending a planning meeting; after disclosure of her identity she recanted and then became unavailable amid alleged threats; the district court admitted her prior statements under forfeiture-by-wrongdoing findings. Defense heavily impeached Burgess at trial and called witnesses to undermine her account.
The district court denied relief: it found any instructional error as to reliance on conspiracy was harmless because the jury necessarily relied on the substantive Hobbs Act robbery (a crime of violence), and it rejected the ineffective-assistance claims, concluding counsel’s strategic choices (including not offering Burgess’s recantation or weak alibi evidence) were reasonable and did not prejudice the outcome. The court also denied an evidentiary hearing and a certificate of appealability.

Issues

Issue	Johnson's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Validity of § 924(c) conviction when jury instructions permitted predicate to be either Hobbs Act robbery or Hobbs Act conspiracy	Jury may have relied on conspiracy (which Johnson argues is not a valid § 924(c) predicate if the residual clause is void), so § 924(c) should be vacated	Jury verdict rested on the substantive Hobbs Act robbery (valid predicate under Force Clause); any instructional error was harmless	Harmless error: conviction stands because record shows jury relied on substantive robbery rather than conspiracy
Whether Hobbs Act robbery is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) Force Clause	Hobbs Act can be violated without intentional violent physical force or by fear of non-violent injury, so it is overbroad and not categorically a crime of violence	Hobbs Act robbery requires use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force; courts uniformly hold it is a crime of violence under the Force Clause	Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the Force Clause; § 924(c) predicate valid
Ineffective assistance for opposing admission of Burgess evidence and failing to present her recantation	Counsel erred in opposing the Government's motion and then failed to present that Burgess recanted; this prejudiced the defense because Burgess was critical to conspiracy proof	Counsel extensively impeached Burgess at trial, reasonably declined to present recantation because it would open door to threat evidence and other damaging admissions; even without Burgess evidence the record of guilt was strong	Denied: counsel's strategic decisions were reasonable under Strickland and Johnson failed to show prejudice
Ineffective assistance for failing to present alibi-type evidence (Greyhound trip, sister's testimony, phone records) to impeach Dunagan	Evidence would have shown Johnson was not in Los Angeles on March 2, 2004, undermining Dunagan's testimony	The alibi evidence was weak/unverifiable, inconsistent, risked being construed as flight; counsel instead pursued stronger impeachment (medical exams, x-rays, expert testimony, background)	Denied: counsel reasonably declined to present weak, risky evidence and did not perform deficiently or cause prejudice

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause; relevant to challenges to § 924(c) residual clause)
United States v. Johnson, 767 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2014) (Ninth Circuit opinion affirming convictions; cited for strength of trial evidence)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 559 U.S. 184 (2010) (categorical approach and realistic probability standard)
Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008) (general-verdict instructions and harmless-error framework)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (substantial and injurious effect standard for harmless error review)
Addonizio v. United States, 442 U.S. 178 (1979) (limits on § 2255 collateral relief)
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (habeas is not a substitute for appeal; procedural default principles)
Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962) (§ 2255 relief limited to fundamental defects)