120 N.E.3d 234
Ind. Ct. App.2019Background
- On Jan. 15, 2014, Shawn Bair walked around a Martin’s supermarket for ~40 minutes, then began shooting; Krystal Dikes and Rachelle Godfread were killed; 64 seconds elapsed from first shot to Godfread’s fatal shot. Police arrived ~2 minutes 43 seconds after the first shot and killed Bair ~5 minutes after shooting began.
- Estate (Anthony Rose, special administrator) sued Martin’s for negligence, alleging the shooting was foreseeable and that Martin’s had a duty to protect or render aid to Godfread.
- Estate designated evidence that Martin’s circulated an “Active Shooter Protocol” memo to managers in Sept. 2012, but did not produce the attached materials; store employees testified they had not seen or been trained from the pocket cards/DVD and that no in-store warnings were made during the incident.
- Both parties moved for summary judgment; trial court granted Martin’s and denied the Estate’s motion, holding under precedent that a sudden shooting inside a supermarket is not foreseeable as a matter of law and Martin’s had no duty before or after the shooting.
- On appeal, the sole consolidated issue was whether Martin’s owed a duty to Godfread (before or after the shooting began); the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for Martin’s.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Martin’s had a duty to anticipate and prevent the shooting (duty before shooting) | Estate: Martin’s contemplated active-shooter risk (protocol memo) so the shooting was foreseeable and it owed a duty to take precautions | Martin’s: shooting was not reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law (analogous to a sudden bar shooting) | Held: No duty before the shooting — a grocery-store shooting is not foreseeable as a matter of law; protocol memo does not convert the broad foreseeability analysis into a duty |
| Whether Martin’s had a duty to protect or render aid after the shooting began (duty after shooting) | Estate: once shooting began, Martin’s had responsibility to act during the 64 seconds before Godfread died (relying on Rogers) | Martin’s: Rogers requires actual knowledge of an injured person; Martin’s did not know Godfread was injured in time to render aid | Held: No duty after shooting — Martin’s lacked knowledge that Godfread was injured before it was too late, so Rogers does not impose a duty here |
Key Cases Cited
- Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar & Grill, 62 N.E.3d 384 (Ind. 2016) (bar shooting not foreseeable as a matter of law; framework for foreseeability as component of duty)
- Rogers v. Martin, 63 N.E.3d 316 (Ind. 2016) (landowner has duty to render aid once they know a guest is injured; distinguishes duty to anticipate initial criminal act from duty after knowledge of injury)
- Paragon Family Restaurant v. Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d 1048 (Ind. 2003) (business owes invitees reasonable care to protect from other patrons)
- Cosgray v. French Lick Resort & Casino, 102 N.E.3d 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (rejects totality-of-circumstances for duty foreseeability; declines to factor general safety materials into duty analysis)
- Certa v. Steak ‘n Shake Operations, Inc., 102 N.E.3d 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (when proprietor observes escalating or known threats on premises, duty to take reasonable steps may arise)