Anthony Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025

Rorrer worked as a City of Stow firefighter from 1999 to July 2008, when a July 4, 2008 eye injury left him monocular and led to termination.
After surgery, Rorrer was cleared to return in September 2008; a return-to-work hold was ultimately reversed, with conflicting communications about fitness to return.
Stow claimed the monocular condition made Rorrer unfit to perform an essential function—driving emergency apparatus—relying on NFPA 1582 guidelines, though the record shows NFPA adoption was disputed and not consistently applied.
Internal City documents listed seventeen essential functions for a firefighter, with driving described as conditional ('May operate') rather than mandatory, and witnesses disputed NFPA adoption.
Rorrer sought accommodations (no driving during emergencies and transfer to the Fire Prevention Bureau); the district court granted summary judgment against him on ADA/Ohio discrimination and First Amendment claims, while allowing some claims to proceed on appeal, and discovery rulings and reassignment requests followed.
The panel ultimately reverses in part to allow trial on the ADA/Ohio discrimination claims before a different judge, affirms on the First Amendment retaliation against Kalbaugh and ADA retaliation claims, and affirms the discovery limitation ruling while granting reassignment on remand.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is driving during emergencies an essential function?	Rorrer contends it is not essential given evidence of accommodation feasibility.	City argues NFPA guidelines make it an essential, non‑curable function.	Genuine dispute; not resolved on summary judgment.
Did the City fail to provide a reasonable ADA accommodation?	Accommodation to not drive or to transfer to FPB was reasonable and feasible.	Driving is essential; FPB transfer unavailable or insufficient.	Issue of fact; remand for trial on ADA/Ohio claims.
Was the interactive process properly completed by the City?	City failed to engage in good faith interactive process to locate accommodations.	Process followed by City satisfied legal duties.	Genuine disputes exist; remand warranted.
Does ADA retaliation claim survive given the asserted protected activity?	Retaliation occurred for protected ADA activity (seeking accommodation).	No protected ADA activity proven or causal link shown.	ADA retaliation affirmatively unresolved; district court not reversed on this claim.
Are First Amendment retaliation claims proper against the City and Kalbaugh?	Speech at Yoder arbitration is protected public concern.	Speech did not address matters of public concern; not protected.	First Amendment retaliation against Kalbaugh affirmed as unsupported; City claim affirmed as unprotected.

Keith v. Cnty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2013) (essential functions and reasonable accommodations; interactive process)
Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173 (6th Cir. 1996) (burden shifting in ADA cases; undue hardship standard)
Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2007) (reasonable accommodation and transfer duties)
Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2001) (conflicting testimony on essential functions; mixed evidence)
Holly v. Clarison Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2007) (employer cannot deem every condition essential by description)
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (Supreme Court 1983) (public concern in speech; Connick standard)
Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995) (public concern and context for speech)
Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2001) (retaliation standards; prima facie case)
Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 1998) (transfer to vacant position; reasonable accommodation)
Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2007) (interactive process and reasonable accommodation)