Anthony Potter v. United States
887 F.3d 785
6th Cir.2018Background
- In 2003 Anthony Potter pleaded guilty to drug and firearms offenses, including being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- A presentence report identified three prior state convictions (Georgia burglary, Georgia obstruction of an officer, Tennessee aggravated assault) that qualified him as an Armed Career Criminal, triggering a 15‑year mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
- The report did not specify whether prior convictions were counted under the elements clause, the enumerated‑crimes clause, or the residual clause; Potter did not object at sentencing. The district court sentenced him to 225 months.
- Potter’s first § 2255 was time‑barred; after Johnson v. United States (invalidating the residual clause) and Welch (making Johnson retroactive), he obtained permission to file a successive § 2255 challenging the enhancement.
- Potter argued his Georgia burglary no longer qualified after Johnson; the district court (the same judge who sentenced him) denied relief, concluding the enhancement rested on the enumerated‑crimes clause (burglary).
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding Potter failed to show the district court relied solely on the invalid residual clause and thus failed to meet his burden to obtain successive collateral relief.
Issues
| Issue | Potter's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson's invalidation of the residual clause allows successive § 2255 relief here | Potter: Johnson removes a basis for his enhanced sentence because his prior burglary relied on the residual clause | Gov: Record and sentencing judge indicate the enhancement rested on the enumerated‑crimes clause (burglary), not the residual clause | Affirmed: Potter failed to show the sentence relied only on the residual clause; enhancement stands |
| Whether Mathis creates a new rule allowing successive relief | Potter: Mathis shows the Georgia burglary statute does not match the federal definition of burglary | Gov: Mathis is a statutory interpretation rule, not a new constitutional rule for successive § 2255 | Denied: Mathis does not permit this successive collateral attack |
| Burden allocation for successive § 2255s after Johnson | Potter: courts should presume possible reliance on residual clause unless proven otherwise | Gov: Movant bears the burden to show Johnson invalidated the specific basis for enhancement | Held: Movant bears burden; courts should not shift burden to government |
| Role of sentencing judge’s subsequent statements | Potter: Post‑sentencing statements insufficient to prove reliance on enumerated clause | Gov: Sentencing judge’s contemporaneous knowledge and later statement support the conclusion the enumerated clause was applied | Held: Judge’s position and record support government; Potter provided no contrary evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (made Johnson retroactive to cases on collateral review)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (statutory‑interpretation rule distinguishing divisible statutes from elements comparison)
- Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959 (6th Cir. 2006) (movant bears burden in § 2255 proceedings)
- United States v. Adams, 91 F.3d 114 (11th Cir. 1996) (Georgia burglary treated as ACCA enumerated offense)
- Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232 (1st Cir. 2018) (sentencing judge’s later statement can be persuasive about original basis for enhancement)
- In re Conzelmann, 872 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2017) (Mathis does not authorize successive § 2255 attacks when it announces a new rule of statutory interpretation)