Anthony Johnson v. Lisa Madigan
880 F.3d 371
7th Cir.2018Background
- Johnson was convicted in 1983 of rape, required to register as a sex offender for ten years; that registration period later expired.
- Illinois amended its Sex Offender Registration Act (2011/2012) to classify as a “sexual predator” anyone convicted of any felony after July 1, 2011, who previously had a registration-triggering conviction requiring registration for more than ten years.
- After a 2013 felony theft conviction, Illinois designated Johnson a sexual predator, imposing lifetime registration and expanded reporting obligations (frequent in‑person registration, disclosure of internet identifiers, travel notices, etc.).
- Johnson sued Illinois officials alleging substantive due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto violations; district court dismissed; on appeal he pursues only the ex post facto claim.
- Johnson moved to Wisconsin before appeal; Wisconsin requires him to register because of Illinois’s sexual‑predator designation, so the court found he retained standing to challenge the Illinois designation.
- The Seventh Circuit held the Illinois statute did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to Johnson because the designation flowed from his 2013 felony conviction (post‑Act), not as a retroactive change to his 1983 conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson has standing after moving to Wisconsin to challenge Illinois’s sexual‑predator designation | Johnson: Illinois designation forces Wisconsin registration; removing designation would relieve current injury | State: Johnson no longer subject to Illinois’s in‑person and location‑based restrictions, so no live controversy | Held: Johnson has standing because Illinois’s designation continues to cause collateral effects (Wisconsin registration) |
| Whether the Illinois Act is retroactive for Ex Post Facto purposes | Johnson: Act attaches new disabilities to the 1983 conviction (making it retroactive) | State: Classification arose from Johnson’s 2013 conviction; Act does not change punishment for the 1983 conviction | Held: Not retroactive — designation is a consequence of the 2013 conviction, not an increased penalty for the 1983 conviction |
| Whether the Act increases punishment (punitive vs. regulatory) as applied to Johnson | Johnson: Expanded registration and reporting burdens are punitive and thus trigger Ex Post Facto protection | State: Characterization disputed; court assumed arguendo punitive for analysis but required retroactivity as well | Held: Even assuming punitive, Johnson fails because the statute did not operate retroactively on his 1983 conviction |
| Whether relief (expungement of designation) would be redressable | Johnson: Removing Illinois designation would remove Wisconsin registration obligation | State: Not disputed substantively | Held: Redressable — vacating the Illinois designation would eliminate the Wisconsin registration duty |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (framework for deciding whether sex‑offender registration is punitive for ex post facto purposes)
- Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948) (habitual‑offender enhancement is punishment for the later crime, not retroactive penalty for earlier crimes)
- Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (test for whether a statute attaches new legal consequences to completed events)
- Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (attributing postrevocation penalties to original conviction in certain supervised‑release contexts)
- Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2014) (standing and extraterritorial limits of sex‑offender restrictions after moving states)
- United States v. Hemmings, 258 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001) (definition of retroactivity for ex post facto analysis)