Anthony, John Dennis Clayton, PD-0290-15

Background

In January 2009 John Dennis Clayton Anthony (then 17 and indigent) pled guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child and was placed on eight years’ deferred adjudication community supervision; the judgment recorded the victim’s age as three years.
The offense date was after Sept. 1, 2007, so Penal Code §22.021(f) applied: where the victim is under six the statutory minimum punishment is 25 years and deferred adjudication is statutorily unavailable under Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12 §5(d)(3)(B).
Trial counsel had earlier suggested possible incompetency; the trial court ordered an expert examination under Art. 46B but no examination report appears in the record and no formal competency proceeding was completed before the plea.
On adjudication following a 2013 revocation proceeding the trial court adjudicated guilt and assessed life imprisonment.
The Seventh Court of Appeals found trial counsel ineffective under Strickland because counsel, the prosecutor, and the judge all mistakenly believed Anthony was eligible for deferred adjudication; the court reversed and ordered Anthony returned to pre‑plea posture.
On discretionary review the State urged correction of the judgment (claiming clerical error re: victim age) and challenged the ineffective‑assistance holding; Anthony contends the appellate court’s ineffective‑assistance ruling is dispositive and that competency/mandatory stay violations render the plea void or voidable.

Issues

Issue	Anthony's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the judgment’s finding that the victim was under six (age 3) — which made deferred adjudication unavailable — was supported by the record or was a clerical error	The age was known to the court (PSI and plea proceedings) and thus the judgment correctly reflects that the child was under six; it is not a clerical error	The State contends no evidence in the appellate record shows the victim was under six and that the age notation was a clerical error correctable nunc pro tunc	Court of Appeals treated the victim’s age as established in the record and relied on it in concluding deferred adjudication was unavailable; State’s nunc argument was rejected at that stage
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for advising Anthony he was eligible for deferred adjudication	Counsel’s incorrect advice (shared by prosecutor and judge) fell below prevailing norms and induced a plea the defendant would not have entered; prejudice exists because the bargain was not legally available	State argued appellant received the deferred adjudication and did not show how counsel’s advice affected the plea or the record lacks foundation for the ineffective claim	Court of Appeals found Strickland prongs satisfied: counsel’s performance deficient and prejudice shown; reversed and restored defendant to pre‑plea position
Whether the trial court’s failure to complete the competency examination (Art. 46B) and to stay proceedings rendered the plea void/voidable	Article 46B required an examination and a mandatory stay once some evidence of incompetency existed; failure to comply deprived Anthony of due process and may void subsequent proceedings	State asserts these matters could be raised later (e.g., habeas) and that appellate relief requested by State would resolve claims	Appellate briefing emphasizes Article 46B protections; Appellant asked for remand/abatement for a competency evaluation if needed; Court of Appeals did not address competency in its disposition because it resolved ineffective assistance first
Proper remedy on discretionary review (strike judgment language vs. remand)	If Court disagrees with ineffective‑assistance finding, the appropriate remedy is remand to address remaining issues (including voluntariness and competency); striking language is improper	State asks Court of Criminal Appeals to reverse court of appeals and order specific corrections (nunc pro tunc)	Court of Appeals ordered reversal and restoration to pre‑plea posture; appellant asks this Court to deny State’s requested corrective relief and either affirm reversal or remand for competency proceedings

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
Ex parte Welborn, 785 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (defense counsel’s duty to know controlling law and consequences)
Brown v. State, 439 S.W.3d 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (failure to follow Article 46B procedures may require retrospective competency hearing/remand)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (Strickland analysis applies to guilty‑plea challenges)
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (U.S. 1970) (right to effective assistance of counsel)
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (U.S. 1966) (failure to observe procedures protecting incompetent defendants denies due process)
Ex parte Marble, 443 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent; defendant must understand law as applied to facts)