208 A.3d 741
D.C.2019Background
- Hooks was sitting in a folding chair on a concrete path leading to a private townhouse yard when four uniformed, armed narcotics officers exited an unmarked car, walked up the confined path, and the lead officer commanded him to “get up.”
- Hooks complied; after standing the officer observed a bag of marijuana in his pocket, the officers handcuffed him, and a search incident to arrest recovered a handgun.
- At a pretrial suppression hearing the judge denied Hooks’s motion to suppress, finding either no seizure occurred or, alternatively, that officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to effect a Terry stop for obstructing a walkway under D.C. Code § 22-1307.
- The government did not contend there was probable cause to arrest; its theory on appeal was that a Terry stop was justified by reasonable suspicion Hooks was violating § 22-1307.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed the legal question de novo, accepted trial-court factual findings unless clearly erroneous, and addressed whether Hooks was seized and, if so, whether the seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hooks) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hooks was "seized" under the Fourth Amendment | The four armed, uniformed officers converging on a confined path and the officer’s command to “get up” communicated that a reasonable person would not feel free to ignore them — a seizure occurred. | No seizure: compliance with a request to stand does not necessarily mean a person was seized; this was a consensual encounter or at most nonseizure. | Held: A seizure occurred — totality of circumstances (threatening presence, command tone, confined path) would make a reasonable person feel not free to leave. |
| Whether officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a Terry stop under § 22‑1307 | Officers lacked the required basis because § 22‑1307 makes the offense contingent on continuing to obstruct after an order to disperse; there was no evidence they had ordered Hooks to cease. | Officers reasonably could have believed Hooks was obstructing a walkway covered by § 22‑1307, justifying a Terry stop; any reasonable mistake about the law might be excused under Heien. | Held: No reasonable suspicion under § 22‑1307 because the statute requires continuation after an officer’s instruction and there was no instruction; Heien does not excuse this half‑statute mistake. |
| Whether suppressed evidence should be excluded or excused (exclusionary rule) | Suppression required to deter clearly unlawful seizures and searches; the officers’ legal mistake was not objectively reasonable. | Government urged that suppression is inappropriate for reasonable mistakes of law (citing Heien/Herring policy arguments). | Held: Exclusionary rule applies; the seizure/search violated the Fourth Amendment and suppression is warranted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (defines permissible investigative stops and seizure inquiry)
- Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (reasonable‑person test: would one feel free to decline officers’ requests)
- United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (examples of circumstances that may indicate a seizure)
- Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014) (reasonable mistake of law can sometimes support reasonable suspicion)
- Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (limits application of exclusionary rule for negligent recordkeeping errors)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (fruit‑of‑the‑poisonous‑tree and exclusionary rule rationale)
- (Albert) Jones v. United States, 154 A.3d 591 (D.C. 2017) (D.C. precedent on seizures in confined spaces and multi‑officer encounters)
