Anthony Hildebrand v. County of Allegheny, 923 F.3d 128

Background

Plaintiff Anthony Hildebrand, a former Allegheny County DA detective, sued under the ADEA and § 1983 for age-based disparate treatment, a hostile work environment, retaliation, and termination following alleged age‑based insults, reassignment, lost overtime, a suspension, and eventual firing in 2011.
The Third Circuit previously affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claims and revived the ADEA claim; the Supreme Court denied certiorari, returning jurisdiction to the District Court in February 2015.
After remand the District Court docket remained administratively closed due to clerical error and no action occurred for about three years; counsel and the parties did not prompt the court to proceed.
Near the end of the hiatus a key defense witness, supervisor Richard Ealing, died; only then did the DA’s Office move to dismiss for failure to prosecute under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
The District Court granted dismissal with prejudice. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding the District Court abused its discretion in applying the Poulis factors.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether dismissal under Rule 41(b) with prejudice was appropriate	Hildebrand contended dismissal was an abuse of discretion given lack of bad faith, plaintiff not personally responsible, available alternatives, and a meritorious ADEA claim	DA argued three-year inactivity prejudiced its defense (including loss of a key witness) justifying dismissal	Vacated: district court abused its discretion; dismissal improper without adequate Poulis analysis and consideration of alternatives and merits
Extent of plaintiff's personal responsibility for delay	Hildebrand argued the record contains no evidence he personally caused or knew of the delay; counsel’s conduct shouldn’t automatically be imputed to him	DA suggested plaintiff, having most at stake, should have inquired about the delay and thus bears responsibility	Court held there was no record support for imputing counsel’s inaction to Hildebrand; district court erred to find personal responsibility without evidence
Prejudice from witness death and delay	Hildebrand acknowledged prejudice but argued alternative sanctions and other available evidence could mitigate harm	DA emphasized Ealing’s centrality and that his death irretrievably impaired defense and trial strategy	Court agreed prejudice from Ealing’s death weighed substantially for dismissal but was not dispositive and must be balanced against other Poulis factors
Consideration of alternative sanctions and meritoriousness of claim	Hildebrand argued the court failed to consider lesser sanctions and erroneously ignored that his ADEA claim on its face is meritorious	DA argued lost witness made lesser sanctions ineffective to cure prejudice	Court found the District Court gave perfunctory treatment to alternatives and failed to analyze the ADEA claim’s merits, errors requiring vacatur

Key Cases Cited

Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984) (six-factor test for dismissal under Rule 41(b))
Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008) (review standard and guidance on Poulis application)
Adams v. Trs. of the N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863 (3d Cir. 1994) (consideration of a plaintiff’s overall litigation history and reluctance to dismiss when some prior responsible conduct exists)
Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871 (3d Cir. 1984) (prejudice examples and cautions favoring decisions on the merits)
Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (dismissal with prejudice is an extreme sanction)
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (imputing counsel’s actions to client in certain circumstances)
Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2003) (prejudice threshold for dismissal requires less than irremediable harm)
Carter v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 804 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1986) (emphasis on sanctioning delinquent lawyers rather than innocent clients)
Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008) (district court must consider alternatives and meritoriousness under Poulis)