Anthony Daunt v. Jocelyn Benson, 999 F.3d 299

Background

In 2018 Michigan voters adopted a constitutional amendment creating a 13‑member Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (4 Republicans, 4 Democrats, 5 non‑affiliated) with detailed eligibility rules and a six‑year look‑back bar on many partisan roles and their close relatives.
Eligibility bars include: declared or elected partisan candidates/officers, party governing‑body members, paid political consultants/employees, lobbyists, legislative employees, certain unclassified state employees, and relatives of such persons.
Plaintiffs (Michigan citizens excluded by those rules) sued, alleging the rules violate the First Amendment (speech/association/petition) and the Equal Protection Clause; they sought a preliminary injunction and later appealed dismissal for failure to state a claim.
The Sixth Circuit previously addressed a preliminary‑injunction appeal (Daunt I), identified Anderson‑Burdick and the unconstitutional‑conditions doctrines as plausible standards, and held the rules likely constitutional; that decision factored into the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
On review the panel treated Daunt I as law of the case (no new factual showing or exceptional reason to depart), applied both Anderson‑Burdick and the unconstitutional‑conditions frameworks, and affirmed dismissal—holding the Commission’s eligibility criteria constitutional.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Do the eligibility rules violate the First Amendment (speech/association/petition) and the Fourteenth Amendment?	The rules exclude would‑be commissioners based on protected partisan activity or associations, penalizing speech/association.	The State’s interest in avoiding conflicts and the appearance of partisan influence in redistricting justifies limited, neutral eligibility rules.	No violation; rules are constitutional.
Which legal standard governs review (Anderson‑Burdick balancing vs. unconstitutional‑conditions or deferential review)?	Anderson‑Burdick is inapplicable or, if applied, plaintiffs deserve heightened/exacting scrutiny.	Anderson‑Burdick may apply; alternatively the unconstitutional‑conditions doctrine does; in any event the rules withstand review.	Court did not choose a single controlling standard but applied both Anderson‑Burdick and the unconstitutional‑conditions frameworks and upheld the rules.
Does the Daunt I preliminary‑injunction opinion bind the later merits‑stage review (law‑of‑the‑case)?	Daunt I was a preliminary ruling and should not control the merits; further factual development could change the outcome.	Daunt I was a fully considered appellate ruling on the legal issues and governs subsequent stages; the pleadings match the prior record.	Daunt I is law of the case here; plaintiffs identified no exceptional circumstances to depart, so prior analysis controls.
Was dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage proper or is further factual development/discovery required?	The constitutional inquiry is fact‑intensive; discovery could show greater burdens or undermine the State’s asserted interests.	The complaint mirrors the preliminary‑injunction record; the statutory terms plainly show only a limited burden and the State’s interests are apparent.	Dismissal affirmed; no required further factual development given the posture and existing record.

Key Cases Cited

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (balancing test for burdens on political rights in election‑related rules)
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (refining Anderson balancing; burden‑dependent scrutiny)
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (unconstitutional‑conditions doctrine overview)
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding limits on partisan activity by government employees)
U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (sustaining restrictions on partisan political conduct by federal employees)
Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982) (upholding waiting‑period restrictions on officeholders; deference to governmental choices)
Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787 (2015) (recognizing state interest in limiting legislative control over redistricting)
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (political‑patronage line of cases protecting against conditioning public employment on political belief)
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (tests for when party affiliation is valid basis for employment decisions)
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990) (limits on patronage‑based hiring and promotion decisions)