Anthony A. v. Commissioner of Correction
166 A.3d 614
| Conn. | 2017Background
- Petitioner Anthony A. was convicted of unlawful restraint (1st degree), failure to appear, and probation violation; a related sexual-assault charge was nolled after the alleged victim (his wife) recanted.
- The Department of Correction classified him as a sex offender (sex-offender treatment need), although he had no sex-offense conviction or prior sex-offender history.
- As a result of that classification, the department conditioned benefits (parole eligibility, supervised community release, and risk-reduction/good-time credits) on participation in sex-offender treatment; petitioner refused treatment.
- Petitioner filed a habeas petition alleging denial of procedural due process from the erroneous sex-offender classification and its consequences; the habeas court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (no protected liberty interest alleged).
- The Appellate Court reversed, applying the federal "stigma plus" framework and remanding for a merits hearing; the Commissioner appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court, holding the petition’s allegations (false stigmatizing classification plus coercive consequences) sufficiently pled a protected liberty interest to confer jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether petitioner alleged a protected liberty interest triggering procedural due process | Anthony alleged he was falsely labeled a sex offender (stigma) and coerced into treatment by loss of parole/credits (plus) | Commissioner argued classifications are discretionary and cannot as a matter of law create a protected liberty interest | Court applied the stigma-plus test and held allegations were sufficient to allege a protected liberty interest, so court has jurisdiction |
| Proper test for prison-classification due-process claims | Use stigma-plus (Vitek) when classification is stigmatizing and the consequences are qualitatively different | Commissioner urged reliance on pre-Sandin discretionary/mandatory dichotomy (Wheway) | Court rejected relying solely on prison officials’ discretion and adopted stigma-plus as appropriate here |
| Whether conditioning parole/good-time on treatment can supply the "plus" | Conditioning benefits on treatment participation is coercive and materially alters status | Commissioner emphasized voluntariness language and administrative discretion | Court agreed courts should look to actual coercive consequences; here allegations that benefits would be forfeited suffice as the "plus" |
| Whether the habeas petition was moot after petitioner’s release | Plaintiff argued collateral-consequences exception applies because prior classification could affect future incarcerations | Commissioner argued release mooted the claim | Court applied collateral-consequences exception and found case not moot for jurisdictional purposes |
Key Cases Cited
- Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (shifted inquiry to whether state action imposed atypical and significant hardship relative to ordinary prison life)
- Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (stigma-plus doctrine: stigmatizing classification plus qualitatively different punishment can create a liberty interest)
- Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (defining baseline/degree of departure for restrictive conditions; supermax confinement satisfies atypical-and-significant inquiry)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation implicates liberty interest; focus on weight/nature of loss)
- Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (state-created liberty interest can arise from statutory limits on disciplinary forfeiture of good-time credits)
- Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (transfers within prison system generally fall within expected conditions of confinement)
- Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (original articulation of stigma-plus concept in due-process/defamation context)
- Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997) (labeling inmates sex offenders is highly stigmatizing; conditioning parole on treatment can be coercive)
- Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2004) (conditioning parole on sex-offender registration/treatment materially indistinguishable from Vitek)
- Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2010) (sex-offender treatment program analogized to compelled transfer/treatment under Vitek)