Annie J. Jones, by and through her conservatorship, Joyce Sons a/k/a Calisa Joyce Sons v. Life Care Centers of America d/b/a Life Care Center of Tullahoma, 715 S.W.3d 257

Background

Annie J. Jones, an elderly nursing home resident with severe dementia, was secretly videoed unclothed during a shower by a certified nursing aide, who displayed her to the aide's incarcerated boyfriend via personal video call.
The incident was detected when jail authorities monitoring the boyfriend saw the video. The nursing facility fired the aide and other employees who failed to report the breach.
Jones's conservator, Joyce Sons, sued the facility for invasion of privacy, negligence, and related claims; the trial court granted summary judgment for the facility, holding actual damages were required.
During the appeal, Jones passed away, and her estate was substituted as plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that intrusion upon seclusion does not require proof of actual damages and that the claim survived Jones’s death under Tennessee’s survival statute.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does an intrusion upon seclusion privacy claim survive the death of the victim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-102?	Sons argued that the survival statute applies because this claim is not for a wrong affecting the character of the plaintiff.	Life Care argued the claim abated because the right to privacy is personal and does not survive death, and the exception for "wrongs affecting character" applies.	The claim survives; the exception for character does not apply to privacy intrusion.
Whether Tennessee’s survival statute is displaced by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652I as interpreted in West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc.	Sons argued the Tennessee statute governs, not the Restatement’s commentary, and the statute’s text controls.	Life Care asserted the common law principle (captured in § 652I) bars survival unless a specific statute says otherwise, and the Tennessee statute is not specific enough.	Tennessee’s statutory language controls; it is sufficiently specific and not superseded by common law or the Restatement.
Does the claim for intrusion upon seclusion require proof of actual damages or harm suffered by the plaintiff?	Sons asserted the tort does not require actual damages—the intrusion itself is the injury.	Life Care claimed there was no cognizable injury because Jones was unaware and suffered no harm, so summary judgment was proper.	Proof of actual damages is not required; denial of summary judgment was correct.
Should amendment of the complaint to clarify privacy invasion and negligent supervision have been allowed?	Amendment was not futile since the claim is viable even without actual damages.	Life Care argued amendment would be futile as no damages could be shown.	The Court of Appeals was correct to remand and allow amendment; not at issue before Supreme Court.

Key Cases Cited

West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640 (Tenn. 2001) (recognizing false light invasion of privacy as actionable; adopts parts of Restatement for privacy torts)
Givens v. Mullikin ex rel. Est. of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383 (Tenn. 2002) (affirming actionable claim for intrusion upon seclusion in Tennessee law)
McDaniel v. Mulvihill, 263 S.W.2d 759 (Tenn. 1953) (discussing statutory abrogation of common law abatement of actions at death)
Weeks v. Mays, 10 S.W. 771 (Tenn. 1889) (claims abate if bad character of plaintiff is a defense; key for interpreting survival statute exception)