Anna Mae Cashin v. Marisela Bello(073215)
123 A.3d 1042
| N.J. | 2015Background
- Cashin owns a 2,435 sq. ft. Hoboken parcel with two separate structures: a six‑unit apartment building (627 Washington St.) and a two‑story single‑family dwelling converted from a garage (626 Court St.).
- Bello has rented and occupied 626 Court St. since 1973; the unit has its own mailing address and separate long‑term use, but tax records and deed do not list it separately.
- Cashin sought to evict Bello under N.J.S.A. 2A:18‑61.1(1)(3) claiming the converted garage is a separate "building" with three or fewer residential units that Cashin intends to personally occupy.
- Trial court dismissed the complaint relying on tax records and found the Court Street unit could not be sold separately; Appellate Division majority affirmed, treating "building" as synonymous with the entire premises and counting all units on the parcel.
- The New Jersey Supreme Court granted review to decide whether "building" in the Anti‑Eviction Act means a single physical structure or the entire parcel/premises.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of "building" in N.J.S.A. 2A:18‑61.1(1)(3) | "Building" is a single physical structure; the converted garage is its own building so the 3‑unit limit applies | "Building" is ambiguous/contextual; should be read to cover the whole premises so all units on the parcel count toward the limit | "Building" means a discrete physical structure (not the whole premises); statute unambiguous and favors separate‑structure analysis |
| Effect of tax/deed records vs. long‑term use | Actual use, separate mailing address, and permits show independent building status despite tax records | Tax records show no separable ownership; that supports treating the parcel as a single premises | Longstanding actual use and separate address outweighed tax records; Court treats the unit as a separate building |
| Role of remedial/tenant‑protective purpose in interpretation | Act is remedial but plain language should control; homeowner rights preserved where statute allows | Because Act protects tenants, ambiguous terms should be construed to maximize tenant protection | Balances both: remedial purpose acknowledged but plain statutory language controls; narrower reading does not conflict with scheme |
| Whether legislative vocabulary ("building" vs "premises") matters | Legislative choice of different words is deliberate; "building" differs from "premises" and limits scope | Related statutes use varied terms; policy and precedent support a broader reading to protect tenants | Legislative use of "building" vs "premises" is meaningful; Court declines to conflate the terms |
Key Cases Cited
- Perez v. Zagami, 218 N.J. 202 (de novo review and statutory interpretation principles)
- DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (statutory‑interpretation goal: effectuate legislative intent)
- Harrison v. Zelko, 272 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. case addressing owner‑occupied exception when structures are separate on same land)
- Sabato v. Sabato, 135 N.J. Super. 158 (Law Div. decision prompting 1975 amendments to restore certain owner rights)