954 F.3d 1267
9th Cir.2020Background
- Galaza worked as a TSA Transportation Security Officer; after injuries and removal from a limited-duty position she was terminated in 2010.
- In 2016 she sued in federal court asserting Title VII claims (sex, race, retaliation) and a Rehabilitation Act disability-discrimination claim; the government moved to dismiss.
- The district court held the Rehabilitation Act claim preempted by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) and dismissed it; it denied the government’s motion to dismiss the remaining Title VII sex and race claims without prejudice to renewal after limited discovery on exhaustion, and it did not separately address the retaliation claim.
- Galaza filed a first amended complaint, later filed a Rule 41(a)(1) notice voluntarily dismissing her Title VII sex and race claims without prejudice, and then appealed only the dismissal of the Rehabilitation Act claim; the district court did not enter a separate final judgment nor meaningfully participate in the voluntary dismissals.
- The Ninth Circuit sua sponte considered appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the dismissals did not produce a final, appealable judgment (absence of district-court involvement and a still-pending retaliation claim).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the district court’s dismissal of the Rehabilitation Act claim after Galaza voluntarily dismissed remaining Title VII claims without prejudice | Galaza argued the voluntary dismissals left no claims to prevent appeal and that, practically, the Title VII claims are effectively foreclosed (statute of limitations), making the order appealable | Government argued there was no final judgment: voluntary dismissals without prejudice are ordinarily non-appealable and the district court did not approve or meaningfully participate; a retaliation claim may still be pending | Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: dismissal without prejudice plus lack of meaningful district-court participation (and a potentially pending retaliation claim) prevented a final, appealable judgment |
| Whether a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissal without prejudice can be treated as a dismissal with prejudice (making the order appealable) | Galaza contended her dismissals should be treated as with prejudice (e.g., SOL expired) and so the partial adverse ruling is appealable | Government argued there was no clear, unambiguous intent to abandon the claims at the time of dismissal and no district-court approval to create finality | Court reiterated limited exceptions (Concha, James, Romoland) where recharacterization is appropriate, but found those exceptions not met here |
| Whether the district court’s preemption ruling on the Rehabilitation Act was reviewable on the merits | Galaza sought review of the Rehabilitation Act dismissal on preemption grounds | Government relied on ATSA preemption and district-court ruling that ATSA preempted the Rehabilitation Act | Ninth Circuit did not reach the merits because it lacked appellate jurisdiction; the district court had held the Rehab Act claim preempted by ATSA |
| Whether the district court’s lack of meaningful participation in the voluntary dismissal affects appealability | Galaza said dismissal was not tactical manipulation and she did not intend to manipulate appellate jurisdiction | Government emphasized that without district-court involvement the dismissal cannot produce finality under Rule 54(b) principles | Court held that meaningful district-court participation is required in these circumstances; absent it, voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not create appellate jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir. 1995) (voluntary dismissal can be treated as with prejudice if parties’ intent is clear)
- James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (district-court approval/participation can render a without-prejudice dismissal final and appealable)
- Am. States Ins. Co. v. Dastar Corp., 318 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2003) (clarifying limits of James and importance of Rule 54(b) and district-court participation)
- Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017) (principle that whole case must be decided in a single appeal absent finality)
- Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980) (subsequent events can sometimes validate a prematurely filed appeal)
- Romoland Sch. Dist. v. Inland Empire Energy Ctr., LLC, 548 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008) (recharacterization of without-prejudice dismissal as with-prejudice only where clear intent exists)
- Ward v. Apple Inc., 791 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2015) (voluntary dismissals with prejudice producing adverse final judgments can be appealed)