Anka v. Yeager (In re Anka)
242 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2019Background
- Anna (party in two custody cases) was represented by attorney Lisa Helfend Meyer in custody disputes involving children from two marriages; a confidential custody evaluation by Dr. Ian Russ (with a psychological evaluation by Dr. Carl Hoppe) was prepared in the Yeager proceeding.
- In a deposition taken in the Anka action, Meyer questioned Yeager about statements to the evaluator and Russ’s findings regarding alleged abuse and parent–child attachment; Yeager largely answered that he did not remember and left before resuming.
- Yeager moved for sanctions under Family Code §§ 3025.5 and 3111(d) for disclosure of information from the confidential custody evaluation prepared in the Yeager case.
- The trial court found the deposition questions disclosed confidential evaluation information maliciously or recklessly, not in the child’s best interest, and ordered Anna and Meyer jointly and severally to pay $50,000 in sanctions.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed sanctions as to Meyer (attorney) and reversed as to Anna (client), holding there was no evidence Anna directed or encouraged the disclosures.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the information Meyer sought was protected by Fam. Code §3025.5 | Yeager: Questions sought information within the scope of confidential custody evaluations and thus were protected | Meyer: Statute protects only the psychological evaluations/recommendations, not other report content | Court: Protection covers statements to evaluator and evaluator’s conclusions (including abuse findings and parent–child relationship) — statute bars such disclosures |
| Whether Fam. Code §3111(d) permits sanctions for disclosure of confidential report information | Yeager: §3111(d) authorizes monetary sanctions for unwarranted disclosure of confidential custody reports | Meyer: §3111 protects only the written report itself, not confidential information within it | Court: §3111(d) authorizes sanctions for disclosure of protected information; Meyer’s parsing rejected |
| Whether the litigation privilege shields Meyer's deposition questions from sanctions | Meyer: Litigation privilege (Civ. Code §47(b)) bars sanctioning her deposition conduct | Yeager: Privilege doesn’t preclude court-imposed sanctions under §3111(d) for unwarranted disclosures | Court: Litigation privilege does not preempt trial court’s authority to impose sanctions under §3111(d) |
| Whether sanctions violated due process or were excessive | Meyer: Order lacked particularized factual findings and fine violated excessive‑fines clauses | Yeager: Trial court made sufficient factual findings and fine was within discretion | Court: Findings in order were adequate for due process; fine not an abuse of discretion given culpability and absence of proof of inability to pay |
Key Cases Cited
- Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal.App.3d 917 (1975) (attorney is officer of the court and owes duties beyond client advocacy)
- Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Assn., 139 Cal.App.2d 241 (1956) (litigation privilege can bar enforcement of certain association rules affecting communications made for litigation)
- Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal.4th 1232 (2007) (litigation privilege can preempt local ordinances in certain contexts)
- In re Marriage of Davenport, 194 Cal.App.4th 1507 (2011) (litigation privilege does not bar sanctions imposed by trial court under certain statutory schemes)
- Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers, 222 Cal.App.3d 970 (1990) (sanctions orders under some statutes must recite detailed factual basis to satisfy due process)
- People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 37 Cal.4th 707 (2005) (test for determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally excessive)