Angelo McMullan v. Raymond Booker, 761 F.3d 662

Defendant Angelo McMullan shot and killed longtime friend Jimmy Smith during a fight after retrieving a revolver from his wife; McMullan testified he intended only to scare Smith and did not recall cocking or aiming the gun.
McMullan was charged with first-degree murder; jury was instructed on first- and second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter but the trial court refused an involuntary-manslaughter instruction; jury convicted McMullan of second-degree murder.
Key witness Gregory McDowell testified for the prosecution; at the time he testified a felony cocaine charge was pending, and two days after he testified the charge was reduced to a misdemeanor in a plea agreement that referenced his agreement to testify against McMullan.
McMullan claimed trial error for refusing the involuntary-manslaughter instruction, ineffective assistance for not cross-examining McDowell about a plea/leniency, and a Brady violation for prosecutorial nondisclosure of any deal.
State appellate courts rejected McMullan’s claims; Michigan Supreme Court affirmed refusal of the involuntary-manslaughter instruction; federal district court denied habeas; Sixth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	McMullan's Argument	State/Respondent's Argument	Held
Trial court refusal to give involuntary-manslaughter instruction	Evidence supported a rational view that only gross negligence or intent to injure occurred, warranting an instruction	No clearly established federal right to lesser-included instruction in non-capital cases; state courts reasonably found malice	Denied — no federal constitutional violation and state factual determination not unreasonable
Ineffective assistance for not cross-examining McDowell about plea/leniency	Counsel should have impeached McDowell with any plea or expectation of leniency	No evidence a plea/agreement existed at time of testimony; counsel’s choices were reasonable; outcome would not likely differ	Denied — state court reasonably applied Strickland
Brady violation for nondisclosure of McDowell’s plea or expectation of leniency	Prosecutor suppressed impeachment evidence that could have changed trial outcome	Even assuming nondisclosure, impeachment was not material enough to create reasonable probability of different result	Denied — state court reasonably applied Brady standard
Scope of habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)	State factual findings were unreasonable and warrant federal relief under § 2254(d)(2)	State-court factual and legal determinations were reasonable and entitled to deference	Denied — petitioner failed to show unreasonable determination of facts or unreasonable application of federal law

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (lesser-included-offense instructions and capital-case considerations)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (standards for § 2254(d) unreasonable application)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part ineffective-assistance standard)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor’s duty to disclose favorable evidence)
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (jury’s role in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1 (2010) (§ 2254(d)(2) allows relief for unreasonable state-court factual determinations)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard for withheld impeachment evidence)
Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982) (standard for giving lesser-included-offense instructions)