279 A.3d 656
Vt.2022Background
- Gates was hired in 1996 and injured her left knee outside work in May 2015; she took FMLA/PFLA leave and returned in August 2015 with a doctor’s note allowing lifting 21–50 lbs "frequently."
- On return in August 2015 she was assigned as a molder operating a Press 30 (lifting 33–35 lb totes periodically); she left that shift due to pain and did not request a specific accommodation then.
- She returned in October 2015 with a medical restriction limiting work to four hours/day and was placed as a part‑time finisher; cleared for full time in November 2015.
- In May 2016 she left work with more restrictive notes (no prolonged standing/lifting/squatting/twisting); she asked to be allowed to perform only light trimming ("trim rings") but was told nothing was available, did not provide a recovery timeline, and did not apply for benefits immediately.
- Employer notified her (May 11) that she had exhausted FMLA/PFLA and to apply for short‑term disability/workers’ compensation; after she filed a workers’ compensation incident report (May 12) the employer terminated her May 20, 2016 because production required reassigning the position.
- Plaintiff sued for FEPA disability discrimination (failure to accommodate in Aug 2015 and May 2016) and retaliation under PFLA and workers’ compensation law; the trial court granted summary judgment for defendant and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to accommodate (Aug 2015): notice | Gates says her doctor’s note put Mack on notice that molder duties exceeded her limits | Mack says the note allowed frequent lifting up to 50 lbs and plaintiff made no accommodation request; molder duties did not obviously exceed the restriction | SJ affirmed — no evidence employer knew limitations required accommodation; no prima facie case |
| Failure to reassign/create light‑duty (May 2016) | Gates says a vacant light‑duty trimming job or a practice of creating light‑duty positions existed (coworker affidavit; manager’s comments) | Mack says trimming was a task within broader jobs, not a standalone vacant position; its transitional duty policy applied only to employees on workers’ comp and was discretionary/temporary | SJ affirmed — no admissible evidence of an existing vacant position or binding policy requiring creation of a light‑duty job |
| Retaliation for PFLA leave and filing workers’ comp (May 2016) | Gates points to timing and alleged inconsistent application of leave/workers’ comp policies as evidence of pretext | Mack proffered legitimate reasons: plaintiff exhausted protected leave, could not perform essential functions, and production required filling the role | SJ affirmed — plaintiff failed to show defendant’s reasons were pretextual |
| Sufficiency of coworker affidavit and policy evidence | Gates relies on Suydam affidavit and handbook language to show policy/practice and create factual disputes | Mack argues the affidavit is vague/lacks personal knowledge and the handbook is discretionary and inapplicable | SJ affirmed — affidavit insufficient and policy language did not obligate Mack to reassign or create positions for non‑occupational injuries |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. G.S. Blodgett Co., 656 A.2d 984 (Vt. 1995) (FEPA disability provisions interpreted using ADA/Rehabilitation Act standards)
- Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1997) (elements of prima facie reasonable‑accommodation claim under Rehab Act/ADA)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial retaliation claims)
- Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 2017) (an employer’s routine practice of creating light‑duty jobs may give rise to accommodation obligations)
- Brady v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (employee normally must inform employer that accommodation is needed)
- Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495 (3d Cir. 2010) (no magic words required; employer must have sufficient information to know of disability and need for accommodation)
- Gauthier v. Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., 129 A.3d 108 (Vt. 2015) (summary judgment standard on appeal)