Andrews v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago
2019 IL 124283
| Ill. | 2021Background
- The Metropolitan Water Reclamation District (District) contracted with a joint venture (general contractor) to perform work at the Calumet plant; contract reserved the District engineer the right to reject unsafe methods but made the contractor responsible for means/methods and jobsite safety.
- F.H. Paschen employee Jeffrey Andrews fell ~30 feet while transitioning between a job-made wooden ladder and an internal fiberglass extension ladder, suffering catastrophic injuries.
- Andrews’s wife sued the District alleging willful and wanton construction negligence (negligence counts previously dismissed under §3-108 immunity); plaintiff alleged the District failed to supervise and implement fall-protection despite knowledge of unsafe practices.
- At summary judgment the District relied on §§2-109 and 2-201 (discretionary immunity), pointing to contract language reserving discretion to the District engineer; deposition evidence showed District engineers were unaware of the specific two-ladder configuration and did not supervise means/methods.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the District; the appellate court reversed, holding the District failed to show its employee actually exercised discretion with respect to the condition that caused the injury.
- The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court: discretionary immunity under §2-201 requires evidence of a conscious decision by the public employee regarding the act/omission that caused the injury; mere reservation of a contractual right is insufficient.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the District is entitled to discretionary immunity under 745 ILCS 10/2-201 for the willful-and-wanton claims | Andrews: No — no District employee made a conscious policy/discretionary decision about the ladder setup | District: Yes — its engineer had contractual authority (and thus discretionary authority) over safety decisions | Held: No — plaintiff wins; District failed to show a conscious exercise of discretion concerning the specific condition that caused injury |
| Whether a contractual reservation of the right to act (but never exercised) is sufficient to invoke §2-201 immunity | Andrews: Reservation alone is insufficient; actual decisionmaking about the condition is required | District: Reservation of discretion in the contract is enough to trigger immunity even if not exercised | Held: Reservation alone is insufficient; immunity requires evidence the employee actually exercised discretion or made a policy determination about the specific act/omission |
| Whether requiring a "conscious decision" to establish §2-201 immunity conflicts with a §414 (Restatement) control/duty defense or unfairly burdens public entities selecting contractors | Andrews: Duty and immunity are distinct; requiring conscious decision does not eliminate §414 defenses | District: The rule undermines §414 defenses and forces municipalities to over-supervise contractors to obtain immunity | Held: Rejected — duty and immunity are separate inquiries; §2-201 still requires proof of conscious decision and does not collapse into or negate §414 analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- Monson v. City of Danville, 2018 IL 122486 (Illinois 2018) (municipality must present evidence it made a conscious decision not to repair/act to invoke §2-201 discretionary immunity)
- In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179 (Ill. 1997) (municipal discretion retained by contract can support immunity where discretion was actually retained and exercised)
- Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335 (Ill. 1998) (statute requires both position involving policy/discretion and that the act/omission be in determining policy and exercising discretion)
- Gutstein v. City of Evanston, 402 Ill. App. 3d 610 (Ill. App. Ct.) (absence of record evidence of a conscious municipal decision defeats discretionary-immunity claim)
- Corning v. East Oakland Township, 283 Ill. App. 3d 765 (Ill. App. Ct.) (no immunity where there was no evidence the defendant was aware of, or consciously decided about, the condition in question)