Andrews v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago
160 N.E.3d 895
Ill.2019Background
- The Metropolitan Water Reclamation District contracted with a joint-venture general contractor to perform work at the Calumet plant; the contract made the contractor responsible for means, methods, temporary structures, and job-site safety but allowed the District’s engineer to “disapprove and reject” unsafe procedures.
- F.H. Paschen employee Jeffrey Andrews fell ~30 feet while transitioning between a job-made wooden ladder and a fiberglass extension ladder in a 29-foot effluent chamber; he suffered catastrophic injuries.
- Andrews’s wife sued the District alleging willful-and-wanton construction negligence (negligence counts had previously been dismissed as barred by a different statutory immunity); the complaint alleged the District knowingly allowed unsafe ladder practices and failed to supervise safety.
- The District moved for summary judgment asserting discretionary immunity under sections 2-109 and 2-201 of the Tort Immunity Act, relying chiefly on the contract language reserving its engineer’s right to disapprove unsafe methods.
- The trial court granted summary judgment; the appellate court reversed, finding no evidence the District’s engineer actually made a conscious policy decision about the ladder configuration; the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the District is entitled to discretionary immunity under 745 ILCS 10/2-109 and 2-201 for Andrews’s injuries | Andrews: no evidence the District (or its resident engineer) actually made any policy decision or consciously exercised discretion regarding the ladder configuration that caused the injury | District: contract reserved the engineer’s right to disapprove unsafe procedures; reservation of discretionary authority is enough to invoke immunity even if not exercised | Held: No. Immunity requires evidence the public employee actually exercised discretion and made a conscious policy determination with respect to the act/omission that caused the injury; District failed to meet its burden; summary judgment improper |
| Whether a contractual reservation of the right to supervise/disapprove is sufficient, standing alone, to establish discretionary immunity | Andrews: a mere contractual reservation without evidence of a conscious decision is insufficient | District: reservation in the contract establishes retained discretion and therefore immunity even if the right was not actually exercised | Held: A contractual reservation alone is insufficient. The court requires proof of a conscious decision concerning the specific condition or conduct that caused the harm |
| Whether requiring proof of a conscious decision conflicts with a Retained-Control/Restatement §414 defense | Andrews: duty and immunity are distinct; plaintiff’s pleading of willful/wanton supervision is sufficient to proceed | District: the Court’s standard will undercut public entities’ ability to rely on Restatement §414 (retained-control) defenses and to show they owed no duty | Held: No conflict. Duty (including §414 retained-control issues) and immunity are separate inquiries; requiring proof of an actual, conscious discretionary decision to invoke §2-201 does not eliminate §414 defenses |
Key Cases Cited
- Monson v. City of Danville, 2018 IL 122486 (local entity must show a conscious decision not to repair or act to establish discretionary immunity)
- In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill.2d 179 (city retained contractual discretion over pile locations; previously found immunity based on retained contractual discretion)
- Harinek v. 161 N. Clark St. Ltd. P’ship, 181 Ill.2d 335 (§2-201 requires both a position involving policy/discretion and that the injury result from an act/omission in determining policy and exercising discretion)
- Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill.2d 466 (definition and scope of discretionary acts)
- Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill.2d 359 (burden on governmental entity to prove entitlement to immunity)
- Corning v. East Oakland Township, 283 Ill. App.3d 765 (no immunity where there was no evidence of a conscious decision regarding the missing stop sign)
- Gutstein v. City of Evanston, 402 Ill. App.3d 610 (rejection of immunity where the record lacks facts about how the municipality assessed the hazardous condition)
- Carney v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2016 IL 118984 (discusses scope of duty and Restatement §414 retained-control principles)