Andrew Wallace v. Commonwealth of Virginia
65 Va. App. 80
Va. Ct. App.2015Background
- Andrew Wallace was arrested Aug. 23, 2012 for indecent liberties with a child; preliminary hearing was Dec. 5, 2012 and he was held continuously in custody thereafter. He was indicted Jan. 14, 2013 and trial proceeded by multiple continuances and repeated requests for new counsel.
- Between Dec. 6, 2012 (day after prelim) and trial the court recorded various continuances attributable to both parties; the court ultimately found 143 days chargeable to the Commonwealth under Code § 19.2-243.
- Wallace challenged two specific intervals as attributable to the Commonwealth: (1) Aug. 13–26, 2013 (after a June Commonwealth continuance) and (2) Jan. 14–Feb. 11, 2014 (continuance because the assigned prosecutor had a family medical emergency).
- The trial court held that the Aug. 13–26 delay was caused by Wallace’s request for new counsel and thus not chargeable to the Commonwealth, and that the Jan. 14 continuance was a permissible, analogous tolling reason under § 19.2-243.
- Wallace entered a conditional guilty plea Aug. 7, 2014 and appealed denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss for statutory and Sixth Amendment speedy-trial violations. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wallace) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether statutory speedy-trial period under Code § 19.2-243 was violated | The Commonwealth failed to try Wallace within the five-month statutory period; two specific delays should be charged to the Commonwealth (Aug 13–26, 2013; Jan 14–Feb 11, 2014) | The August delay resulted from Wallace’s requests for new counsel; the January continuance was for a prosecutor family medical emergency which is analogous to enumerated tolling reasons | Court held only 143 days charged to Commonwealth; August delay attributable to Wallace; January continuance tolls the clock as a similar, permissible excuse; statutory claim fails |
| Whether Aug. 13–26, 2013 delay is attributable to the Commonwealth | The Commonwealth’s June motion to continue until Aug. 26 makes that entire period Commonwealth delay | Wallace later requested new counsel and expressly moved to continue on Aug. 13, joining/creating the intervening delay | Court held the August continuance was "on motion of the defendant" and thus not chargeable to the Commonwealth |
| Whether Jan. 14–Feb. 11, 2014 continuance (prosecutor family emergency) is an excusable tolling reason under § 19.2-243 | Emergency is not among enumerated exceptions; other prosecutors in the office could have tried the case | Prosecutor is functionally like a key Commonwealth witness; a family medical emergency is of a similar nature to enumerated exceptions and substitution on eve of trial could be unethical if unprepared | Court held family medical emergency is a similar, permissible exception; delay not charged to Commonwealth |
| Whether Wallace’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated | Nearly two years passed from arrest to plea; automatic presumption of prejudice and violation | Majority of delay was attributable to Wallace (replacement counsel requests), Wallace did not genuinely seek prompt trial, and he suffered no shown trial-preparation prejudice | Court applied Barker factors and held Wallace’s constitutional speedy-trial claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 381 (Va. Ct. App. 2010) (burden on Commonwealth to show delay is excused under § 19.2-243)
- Robinson v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 148 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (five-month period begins day after preliminary hearing)
- Heath v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 389 (Va. 2001) (defendant-caused delay tolls statutory clock even when earlier continuance was by Commonwealth)
- Stephens v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 224 (Va. 1983) (statutory exceptions to speedy-trial statute are not exclusive; similar excuses may be implied)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (four-factor balancing test for Sixth Amendment speedy trial claims)
- Fowlkes v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 763 (Va. 1977) (constitutional speedy-trial analysis—arrest starts Sixth Amendment clock)