162 So. 3d 1133
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2015Background
- Giamberini has been a Florida firefighter since 1996; his 1993 no contest felony plea for aggravated battery with adjudication withheld was known to the Department at initial certification.
- The 1993 plea did not disqualify him from initial firefighter certification in 1996 under the then-law.
- In November 2012, Giamberini applied for firesafety inspector certification; in April 2013 the Department denied the application based on the 1993 felony plea, citing Chapter 633, Florida Statutes.
- The Department expressly did not consider section 112.011, Florida Statutes, in the denial.
- An informal hearing followed; the hearing officer recommended denial based on the felony history and certain statutory sections; the Department adopted the recommendation in November 2013.
- Giamberini appealed, arguing that the statutes, read together, require granting certification because he is a firefighter; the trial court (on review) affirmed the Department’s denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do 633.216(2) and 633.412(1)(b) bar firesafety inspector certification for a firefighter with a prior felony plea? | Giamberini: read together, the statutes should grant certification since he is already a firefighter. | Department: the plain language disqualifies anyone who pleaded nolo contendere to a felony when seeking firesafety inspector certification. | Yes, the Department correctly denied certification based on the felony plea. |
| Does section 112.011(1)(b) modify Chapter 633 to allow certification despite the felony plea? | Giamberini argues 112.011 modifies 633 to permit certification. | Department argues 112.011 is subordinate to specific Chapter 633 provisions and does not override them. | No, 112.011 does not alter the specific Chapter 633 requirements; 633 controls. |
| Is the Department estopped or required to grant certification due to prior firefighter certification? | Giamberini suggests equity given long service and rehabilitation. | Department relies on statutory eligibility; no estoppel to override statutory disqualification. | Estoppel rejected; statutory scheme controls. |
Key Cases Cited
- Conservation Alliance of St. Lucie Cnty. Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 144 So. 3d 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (agency deference in statutory interpretation)
- Fla. Dep’t of Educ. v. Cooper, 858 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (agency interpretation within reasonable range)
- Capo v. Fla. Pub. Emps. Council 79, 82 So. 3d 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (statutory interpretation and reasonableness)
- Brown v. City of Vero Beach, 64 So. 3d 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (plain meaning governs unless absurdity)
- Archstone Palmetto Park, LLC v. Kennedy, 132 So. 3d 347 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (harmonious reading of statute parts)
- Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1959) (principles of statutory interpretation)
- Fla. Virtual Sch. v. K12, Inc., 148 So. 3d 97 (Fla. 2014) (recent statute controls over older ones)
- McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1994) (legislative intent and last expression of intent)
- Jackson v. Stinchcomb, 451 F. Supp. 494 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (older 112.011 interpretation involved four-year hiatus provision)
- Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974) (rehabilitation objective of withheld adjudication)
- Kauk v. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., 131 So. 3d 805 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (restoration of civil rights not automatic bar)
- Lombardi, Inc. v. Smithfield, 11 A.3d 1180 (Del. 1989) (irreparable harm is the most important factor for a preliminary injunction)