30 F.4th 584
6th Cir.2022Background
- The Rice family owns an 80+ acre farm in Monroe Township, Ohio, and sought to develop it as the "Concord Trails" residential PUD through a purchase agreement with a developer.
- They pursued annexation into the Village of Johnstown and concurrent PUD rezoning; Johnstown allowed PUD applications to proceed before annexation and staff had encouraged concurrent processing.
- Under the Johnstown code at the time, Planning & Zoning (P&Z) Commission preliminary approval was required, was effectively final (not appealable), and the Village Council historically deferred to Commission preliminary approvals.
- The P&Z Commission denied the Rice family’s preliminary PUD application (Sept. 2018); annexation later lapsed or was rejected, and the development failed.
- The Rice family sued under the Fourteenth Amendment (and Ohio Constitution) alleging an unlawful, standardless delegation of legislative power to private/unaccountable actors (an Eubank-style claim), seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief; the district court granted summary judgment for Johnstown for lack of standing.
- The Sixth Circuit held the Rice family had Article III standing for their procedural/Eubank claim (sufficient injury, causation, redressability at least for damages), but the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because Johnstown amended the ordinance to make the Commission’s action a nonfinal recommendation; the damages claim survives and the case was remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to sue under the Fourteenth Amendment for an alleged unlawful delegation (procedural/Eubank claim) | Rice: The Commission’s standardless, final review deprived them of procedural due process tied to a concrete economic interest (development losses) — injury, traceable to the challenged process, redressable (damages). | Johnstown: The Rice property lies in Monroe Township so the ordinance didn’t apply; any injury flowed from annexation denial or the family’s decision to apply before annexation, not the Commission’s process. | Majority: Rice has Article III standing — procedural injury shown, causation satisfied by intertwined zoning/annexation facts, and redressability exists (nominal/compensatory damages). Dissent would deny standing. |
| Nature of federal claim: Is this a federal nondelegation claim or a due-process/Eubank claim? | Rice: Framed as unlawful delegation of legislative power to private/unaccountable actors depriving due process. | Johnstown: No federal nondelegation to Congress; claim should be state-law nondelegation or fail. | Court: The claim best fits the Eubank line as a species of procedural due process (private nondelegation/Eubank doctrine), not the Article I nondelegation doctrine. |
| Mootness of declaratory and injunctive relief attacking Ordinance 1179.02 | Rice: Wants ordinance declared unconstitutional and enjoined to prevent future standardless final Commission action. | Johnstown: Ordinance was amended to require the Commission to issue a preliminary recommendation to Council (Council makes final decision), so prospective relief is moot. | Held: Declaratory and injunctive claims are moot because the challenged feature (final, unreviewable Commission action) was removed; equitable relief affirmed as denied. |
| Remedies and redressability: Do damages remain available? | Rice: Seeks compensatory damages for application fees and expenses; nominal damages available for procedural injury. | Johnstown: Mootness/standing bars relief; alternatively denies liability on the merits. | Held: Monetary relief (including nominal/fees) survives; summary judgment for Johnstown reversed as to damages and remanded for merits and damages adjudication. |
Key Cases Cited
- Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) (establishes due-process concern where private parties are given final, standardless power over neighbors’ property uses)
- Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) (applies Eubank principle; condemns conditioning construction on consent of potentially self-interested neighbors)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury-in-fact, causation, redressability; summary-judgment burden explained)
- Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (due process protects only liberty or property interests; property-interest threshold for procedural due-process claims)
- Kiser v. Kamdar, 831 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2016) (treats Eubank/private nondelegation as a species of procedural due process)
- Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792 (2021) (nominal damages can redress past procedural injuries and thus satisfy redressability)
- City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (distinguishes Eubank/Roberge in the modern zoning context)
- Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidates delegation to private, self-interested parties; cited as related nondelegation/Eubank authority)