Andrew Luke Lemasters v. State of Missouri, SC97878

Jury convicted Andrew Lemasters of one count of first-degree statutory sodomy; a second charged count was dismissed before verdict but the written judgment mistakenly recorded convictions on both counts.
On direct appeal this Court affirmed the conviction on the first count, vacated the second, and remanded with directions that the trial court vacate its judgment as to the second count; mandate issued March 12, 2015 (State v. Lemasters).
The trial court’s docket later showed an entry of "Affirmed," and the court had previously (while appeal was pending) entered an amended judgment correcting the error; the appellate court and parties were unaware of that amendment when the mandate issued.
Lemasters filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion on June 17, 2015 (97 days after the mandate). The motion court allowed his counsel’s motion to treat the pro se motion as timely, citing alleged third-party interference, held an evidentiary hearing, and denied relief on the merits.
On appeal the Missouri Supreme Court held the trial court failed to comply strictly with the mandate, so no new final judgment after remand existed; therefore Lemasters’s Rule 29.15 motion was premature. The court vacated the motion-court judgment and remanded, directing the pro se motion be deemed filed when the Rule 29.15 filing period commences after proper compliance with the mandate.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the Rule 29.15 motion timely / was the motion premature because the trial court failed to comply with the mandate?	Lemasters: mandate not effectuated; judgment not final; filing period hasn't begun.	State: conviction on the affirmed count became final with the mandate; Lemasters waived contest by requesting timeliness below.	Court: Trial court did not strictly comply with mandate; no final, new judgment; motion premature. Motion-court judgment vacated and cause remanded.
Did the motion court err in treating the pro se motion (filed 97 days after mandate) as timely under a third-party interference exception?	Lemasters: delay caused by lack of access to a notary and prison-related interference (invoking Price).	State: Lemasters waived review by seeking timeliness; no evidence of interference presented.	Court did not reach the merits because motion was premature; directed premature motions be held pending and deemed filed when the Rule 29.15 filing period commences.

State v. Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d 416 (Mo. banc 2015) (direct appeal that affirmed one count, vacated second, and remanded with directions)
Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. banc 2014) (third-party interference can excuse untimely filing in some circumstances)
Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260 (Mo. banc 2012) (courts must enforce Rule 29.15 time limits and resulting waiver)
Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 410 S.W.3d 623 (Mo. banc 2013) (appellate mandates with directions must be strictly followed)
Gerken v. Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Family Support Div., 415 S.W.3d 734 (Mo. App. 2013) (distinguishes general remand from remand with directions; trial court may not deviate from specific directions)
McKay v. State, 520 S.W.3d 782 (Mo. banc 2017) (Rule 29.15 relief is a collateral attack on a final judgment)
Pirtle v. Cook, 956 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. banc 1997) (trial court may correct its judgment while appeal pending, but such correction has specific effects on finality)