Andrew K. Armbrister v. Melissa H. Armbrister
414 S.W.3d 685
Tenn.2013Background
- Parents (both dentists) divorced in 2009; final Permanent Parenting Plan (PPP) named Mother primary residential parent and gave Mother 280 days/ Father 85 days per year; Father did not appeal the original decree.
- In 2011 Father filed to modify the PPP, alleging remarriage, relocation (Greeneville to Jonesborough ~30 minutes away), changed work schedule (sold partial practice, bought new practice, more flexibility), and children’s increased age.
- Trial court found these changes constituted a material change in circumstances and modified the residential schedule to Mother 222 days / Father 143 days; Father’s support was reduced accordingly.
- Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning Father’s remarriage and move were reasonably anticipated and thus not material; one judge dissented.
- Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to decide whether a petitioner seeking modification of a residential parenting schedule must prove the alleged material change could not reasonably have been anticipated when the original plan was entered.
Issues
| Issue | Armbrister (Father) Argument | Armbrister (Mother) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether a petitioner must prove an alleged material change could not reasonably have been anticipated when the original residential parenting schedule was established | Section 36-6-101(a)(2)(C) governs modification of residential schedules; petitioner need only prove a material change affecting the child’s best interest by a preponderance — no requirement that change be unanticipated | Prior Tennessee cases (e.g., Blair/Kendrick/Cranston line) had emphasized reasonable foreseeability; Court of Appeals applied that consideration outcome-determinatively | Supreme Court held the 2004 statute (Tenn. Code Ann. §36-6-101(a)(2)(C)) abrogates any prior requirement that changes be unanticipated; reasonably anticipated changes may still support modification if they affect child’s best interests |
| 2) Whether Father proved a material change in circumstances under §36-6-101(a)(2)(C) (facts: remarriage, relocation, changed work schedule, children older) | These developments qualify under the statute’s examples (changes in child’s needs with age; significant changes in parent’s living/working condition) and were proven by a preponderance | Mother argued changes were not material because they were foreseeable or insufficiently disruptive | Court affirmed trial court: evidence did not preponderate against finding material change |
| 3) Whether modification served the children’s best interests | Father: increased time and involvement (coaching, extracurriculars), positive stepmother relationship, greater work flexibility — supports best interests | Mother: PPP had worked well; children stable; extra time had been voluntarily permitted previously | Court upheld trial court’s best-interests finding after weighing statutory factors and concluded modification was within trial court’s discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Hicks v. Hicks, 176 S.W.2d 371 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943) (original articulation of "material change" concept tied to new facts/emergencies)
- Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137 (Tenn. 2002) (addressed foreseeability as a factor in modification analysis)
- Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566 (Tenn. 2002) (clarified framework for modification and material-change inquiry)
- Cranston v. Combs, 106 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. 2003) (refused to require proof of substantial harm and discussed foreseeability)
- Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82 (Tenn. 2001) (standard for appellate review of trial court parenting-plan decisions)
- Boyer v. Heimermann, 238 S.W.3d 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (observed §36-6-101(a)(2)(C) lowered threshold for residential-schedule modifications)