27 F.4th 384
6th Cir.2022Background
- Andrew Johnson pleaded no contest in Michigan to delivery of cocaine, delivery of heroin, and possession of marijuana and was sentenced as a habitual offender to concurrent terms (99 months–30 years and 46 months–30 years).
- In December 2015 Johnson (with new counsel) filed a state postconviction motion seeking to withdraw his plea (ineffective assistance of counsel) and resentencing (judge-found facts). A hearing was set but later canceled after the prosecutor disputed factual assertions.
- Johnson moved for discovery in March 2017; the state trial court ordered his trial counsel to produce files and to appear for interview/hearing. Johnson secured an affidavit from trial counsel but did not file it or request an evidentiary hearing; the court did docket plea and sentencing transcripts at his request.
- In August 2019—while the state postconviction motion remained unresolved—Johnson filed a federal habeas petition asserting the state-court delay excused exhaustion under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii).
- The district court dismissed the habeas petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding Johnson did not show extraordinary circumstances beyond his control rendering the state process ineffective.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether exhaustion excused under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) because of inordinate delay | Johnson: state-court delay was inordinate and thus the exception applies so federal habeas may proceed | State: remedies remained available; delay not attributable to the state alone; Johnson failed to pursue discovery/hearing in state court | Held: Exception not satisfied; delay alone—without circumstances beyond petitioner’s control rendering state process incapable—does not excuse exhaustion |
| Who bore responsibility for the delay | Johnson: state courts took too long to resolve his postconviction motion | State: court and prosecution acted (hearing scheduled, discovery granted); Johnson did not follow up or request hearing after discovery/transcripts filed | Held: record shows state responded (discovery granted, transcripts docketed); Johnson failed to pursue available steps, so delay not “clearly” the state’s fault |
| Whether Johnson had exhausted available state remedies before filing federal habeas | Johnson: further delay made state process ineffective; federal relief appropriate | State: Johnson still had available state procedures (request hearing, file affidavit, seek further discovery) that he did not use | Held: Johnson had not exhausted and did not show futility—dismissal for failure to exhaust affirmed |
| Validity and proper scope of the “inordinate delay” doctrine | Johnson relied on prior Sixth Circuit cases applying inordinate-delay excusal | Majority: the inordinate-delay label must be read narrowly to conform to § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii); Concurrence: inordinate-delay doctrine is consistent with the statute | Held: Court narrows application—excusal requires circumstances beyond petitioner’s control that render state process ineffective; concurrence agreed with outcome but not the majority’s characterization of the doctrine |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (establishing pre-statutory exhaustion/comity principle)
- Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (pre-statute rare-exception doctrine informing § 2254 interpretation)
- Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (Supreme Court decision that promoted a flexible approach to exhaustion — later criticized)
- Workman v. Tate, 957 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1992) (origin of Sixth Circuit’s inordinate-delay jurisprudence)
- Turner v. Bagley, 401 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2005) (excusing exhaustion where state conduct made further state process futile)
- Phillips v. White, 851 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2017) (inordinate-delay excusal where state court inactivity was extreme)
- Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016) (statutory exhaustion provisions not subject to judge-made exceptions)
- Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1 (per curiam) (federal courts should interfere only in rare cases where state corrective process is clearly deficient)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (procedural-default/exhaustion principles and respect for state-court processes)