Andrew Ellis v. City of Minneapolis
518 F. App'x 502
8th Cir.2013Background
- Andrew and Harriet Ellis owned a Minneapolis rental property that was severely damaged by fire in January 2006 and was demolished by the City in June 2006 after the City declared it a nuisance.
- The Ellises exhausted administrative and state-court challenges; the Minnesota Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the City’s demolition order in 2009.
- In January 2012 the Ellises (pro se) filed a federal complaint asserting negligence, violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), state building code, and due process, and sought injunctive relief under the FHA.
- The City moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim (or for a more definite statement). The district court dismissed the FHA claims as both inadequately pleaded and time-barred, and cancelled a scheduled hearing after Andrew Ellis declined it.
- The Ellises filed a Rule 59(e) motion and sought leave to amend; the district court denied relief, finding no proper motion to amend had been filed and any amendment would be futile.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed: the FHA claims were inadequately pleaded and time-barred, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend for procedural noncompliance, and denial of Rule 59(e) relief was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether the complaint states a claim under the FHA | Ellis alleged the City’s demolition and related conduct violated the FHA and sought injunctive relief | City argued the complaint contained only conclusory recitations of FHA elements and lacked supporting facts | Court: Complaint failed to state a plausible FHA claim; dismissal affirmed |
| 2) Whether FHA claims are time‑barred | Ellis sought relief based on fire and demolition (2006); implied claim that violations continued | City asserted 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) two‑year limitations period bars claims filed in 2012 | Court: Claims are time‑barred; no adequately pleaded ongoing violations were alleged |
| 3) Whether district court abused discretion by denying leave to amend | Ellis requested leave to amend in opposition memo and by letter, arguing pleading defects could be cured | City argued no proper motion or proposed amended complaint was filed per local rules | Court: Denial proper; plaintiffs failed to follow local rule (no proposed/redlined complaint) and district court did not abuse discretion |
| 4) Whether Rule 59(e) relief or post‑judgment amendment was warranted | Ellis sought to alter judgment and to amend post‑judgment to cure defects | City argued Rule 59(e) is limited, amendments are disfavored, and plaintiffs still failed procedural requirements | Court: Denial proper; no manifest error, no newly discovered evidence, and procedural noncompliance justified refusal to permit post‑judgment amendment |
Key Cases Cited
- Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1999) (complaint must contain more than conclusory allegations to survive dismissal)
- Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1985) (pro se complaints liberally construed but must plead sufficient facts)
- O’Neil v. Simplicity, Inc., 574 F.3d 501 (8th Cir. 2009) (district court may deny leave to amend when plaintiff fails to follow procedural rules)
- Meehan v. United Consumers Club Franchising Corp., 312 F.3d 909 (8th Cir. 2002) (denial of leave to amend appropriate for procedural failures)
- United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 2006) (Rule 59(e) limited to correcting manifest errors or presenting newly discovered evidence)
- Morrison Enters., L.L.C. v. Dravo Corp., 638 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2011) (post‑judgment amendment is disfavored)